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Summary 
The doctrine on Rule of Law is intrinsic to what it means to live in a 
democratic society. It is a legal philosophy which has been, and continues to 
be, actively applied by courts and international organizations such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the United Nations, as an absolute 
necessity to promote and enforce justice and peace across the globe. Despite 
diverse interpretations of the meaning of Rule of Law, accountability (or 
responsibility of those in power, as it is sometimes called), remains at the 
heart of the concept. As an illustration, a society void or Rule of Law is 
also, per definition, void of accountability. Renowned Professor Peczenik 
identifies two types of accountability: informal responsibility, where 
governments will face a loss of power in upcoming elections if they do not 
satisfy the wishes of the constituency, and formal responsibility, where 
criminal actions shall be judged according to the law in a manner equal to 
all citizens. 
 
The world recently found itself in a situation where states that are usually 
thought of as champions of the democratic world were revealed to sidestep 
the most fundamental of principles of Rule of Law. The Snowden reports 
showed how the US, the UK, Sweden and Germany (among other states) 
entertain secret intelligence exchange agreements, legislation, networks and 
operations; all of which affect billions of citizens around the world who are 
unable to foresee the consequences of their actions. This undermines the 
very essence of the principle of legality. 
 
Allowing to compromise the principle of legality in an unchecked manner 
would, ultimately, mean the end of democracy. Therefore, to elucidate 
principles of Rule of Law and democracy in the field of signals intelligence, 
this work evaluates the legality of current SIGINT exchanges using a 
classical legal method and jurisprudence to assess the adequacy of three 
levels of legislation: international law, regional law and bilateral treaties. 
The work finds that the assessed states violate international law, regional 
law and Rule of Law on a number of points. These include using diplomatic 
missions in a way contrary to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, allowing undisclosed agreements and legislation, and scanning 
communication contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
states might possibly have breached the principle of non- intervention and 
conducted intelligence acquisition contrary to the specified objectives of 
agreements. However, it should be noted that more information is needed to 
comprehensively assess the two last points. 
 
Consequently, the thesis finds that the existing legal framework for SIGINT 
exchange is rigorous in itself. International law and conventions condemn 
the revealed actions in a clear way, and there is good basis to read ECtHR 
case- law as forbidding all hidden legislation and pact- making which might 
affect citizens in an unforeseeable way. Furthermore, it is reasonable that 
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the ECtHR would strike down on parties who contract another state in 
surveillance matters to circumvent civil rights obligations, on the basis of 
the doctrine of ‘effective control’. However, the difficulty in enforcing 
accountability in those fora is procedural. ECtHR can only hear cases and 
expand its case- law if a domestic case exhausts all local remedies, which 
will be a lengthy and costly process; moreover, the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice relies on the fulfillment of specific criteria, 
which ultimately depend on the will of the parties. Meanwhile, states violate 
civil- rights and undermine core principles of democracy. 
 
As such, the thesis finds that there is a need for a stronger regional 
framework in the field. An example of this could be a supervisory organ in 
the EU, proactively enforcing principles of Rule of Law in the states’ 
domestic legislation, without the procedural hindrances of a tribunal. 
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Sammanfattning 
Doktrinen kring rättsstatsprincipen är nära sammanflätad med innebörden av 
ett demokratiskt samhälle. Det är en rättsfilosofi som appliceras aktivt i 
domstolar och internationella organisationer såsom Europadomstolen och 
Förenta Nationerna, som en absolut nödvändighet för att främja och 
implementera rättvisa och fred på jorden. Trots skiljda tolkningar angående 
vad principen om rättsstaten innebär, förblir ansvarsskyldighet centralt till 
begreppet, då ett samhälle i avsaknad av rättstatsprincipen också, per 
definition, saknar ansvarsskyldighet. Den prominente professorn Peczenik 
identifierar två typer av ansvarsskyldighet- informellt ansvar där regeringar 
ej längre kommer vara vid makten efter nästkommande val om de inte 
tillmötesgår väljarnas önskemål, och formellt ansvar där kriminella 
handlingar ska bedömas i ljuset av lagen på ett sätt som är lika för alla 
medborgare. 
 
Världen befann sig nyligen i en situation där stater som vanligen anses vara 
förkämpar för den demokratiska världen visade sig kringgå de mest 
fundamentala av principer som tillsammans utgör rättsstaten. Snowden- 
avslöjandena visade att USA, Storbritannien, Sverige och Tyskland (bland 
andra) underhåller hemliga informationsutlämningsavtal, lagar, nätverk och 
uppdrag, varav alla dessa påverkar miljarder människor över hela jorden, 
som är inkapabla av att förutse konsekvenserna som deras handlingar 
eventuellt har. Detta underminerar en central del av legalitetsprincipen.  
 
Att tillåta ett förminskande av legalitetsprincipen på ett okontrollerat sätt 
skulle slutligen innebära demokratins bortgång. Således, för att klargöra vad 
rättsstatsprincipen och demokrati innebär i ett signalspaningskontext, 
utvärderar detta verk lagligheten av nuvarande signalspaningsutbyten 
genom en traditionell rättsdogmatisk och rättsfilosofisk metod, adekvansen 
hos tre nivåer av lagstiftning: internationell rätt, regional rätt och bilaterala 
avtal. Avhandlingen finner att de berörda staterna kränker internationell rätt, 
regional rätt och rättsstatsprincipen på ett antal sätt. Dessa inkluderar 
användandet av diplomatiska beskickningar på ett sätt som är oförenligt 
med Vienkonventionen om Diplomatiska Förbindelser, tillåtandet av 
hemliga avtal och lagstiftning samt inhämtning av 
kommunikationsinformation i strid med Europakonventionen om de 
Mänskliga Rättigheterna. Staterna har också eventuellt brutit mot principen 
om non- intervention och signalspanat på ett sätt som inte är förenligt med 
informationsutlämningsavtalens syften.  Dock bör det tilläggas att mer 
information behövs för att uttömmande analysera de två sista påståendena.  
 
På så sätt framgår det i avhandlingen att de existerande regelverken för 
signalspaning är rigorösa i sig själva: internationell rätt och konventioner är 
tydliga i att de inte tillåter sådant agerande som Snowden- avslöjandena 
visade och det finns god basis att argumentera för att Europadomstolens 
praxis förbjuder all hemlig lagstiftning och hemliga avtal som kan påverka 
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medborgare på ett oförutsebart sätt. Vidare är det rimligt att 
Europadomstolen skulle fälla en stat som kontrakterar en annan stat i 
signalspaningsärenden för att kringgå sina förpliktelser gentemot 
medborgarna, i ljuset av doktrinen kring ’effective control’. Dock finns det 
processrättsliga hinder att utöva ansvarsskyldighet i dessa fora. 
Europadomstolen kan endast ta upp ett fall till prövning och utöka sin praxis 
om målet har uttömt alla inhemska rättsmedel, vilket ofrånkomligen 
kommer vara en långdragen och kostsam process. Vidare är den 
internationella domstolen i Haag bunden av uppfyllandet av specifika 
kriterier, vilka slutligen beror på partsviljan staterna emellan. Under tiden 
som fall inte kan tas upp till prövning på grund av processrättsliga hinder i 
internationella tribunaler fortsätter stater att underminera medborgares 
rättigheter och demokratiska principer. 
 
Således når avhandlingen slutsatsen att det finns behov av ett starkare 
regionalt ramverk inom området. Ett sådant exempel hade kunnat vara ett 
kontrollorgan inom EU som på ett proaktivt sätt hade kunnat se till att 
inhemsk lagstiftning i signalspaningsområdet blir till och fungerar på ett sätt 
som är förenligt med rättsstatsprincipen, utan de processrättsliga hinder som 
tillkommer en tribunal. 
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Abbreviations 
ARSIWA  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for  
  Internationally Wrongful Acts 
BND  Bundesnachrichtendienst 
BNDG  Bundesnachrichtendienstgesetz 
COMINT  Communications intelligence  
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights  
EU  European Union 
FAA  FISA Amendments Act 
FISA  Foreign Intelligence Service Act 
FRA  Försvarets Radio Anstalt (Swedish National 
  Defence Radio Establishment) 
GCHQ  Government Communications Headquarters 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
  Rights 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
  Yugoslavia 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NSA  National Security Agency 
PCIJ  Permanent Court of International Justice 
RF  Regeringsformen 
RIPA  Regulations of Investigatory Powers Act 
SIGINT  Signals intelligence 
UK   United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
US  United States 
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1 Introduction  
June 2013 presented a remarkable shift in how the world perceived issues of 
signals intelligence. Whistle- blower Edward Snowden leaked a substantial 
number of top- secret documents which showed that the existing 
frameworks of international surveillance reached well beyond counter- 
terrorism efforts into the pushing of specific economic, political and military 
agendas, often including espionage on an individual level.
1
 The reach of the 
signals intelligence agencies seemed boundless, penetrating the United 
Nations General Assembly, European Union delegations and the phone of 
Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany. The world had heard reports of 
illicit surveillance before, but Snowden presented something new: allies 
spying on allies, and domestic agencies operating under such liberal 
mandates that parliaments and senators demanded clarifications as to 
whether or not they had been subject of espionage by their own security 
agencies.
2
 
3
  
 
At the time of the Snowden- leaks, I lived in China where I held a position 
at the Swedish embassy. Coverage on the topic was intense, not only 
because of universal interest in the material, but also because Edward 
Snowden was reportedly hiding in Hong Kong. In China, I had witnessed 
how the Western community previously denounced instances of Chinese 
hacking of foreign databases as unlawful, and I enjoyed the chance to 
discuss the new developments in the informal setting of the staff coffee 
room with experienced professionals from legal, political and economic 
vantage points. I was curious to find out how the Western community 
(particularly the USA) would justify its actions now that it was on the 
receiving end of criticism, and if the leaks would garner a shift in Sino- 
Western rhetoric on the matter. I found that media coverage focused 
primarily on the political effects of the disclosure and speculations around 
what fate Edward Snowden might face. What I did not find, however, was 
an awareness of the larger legal repercussions of the reports: what happens 
when states disregard basic international law? What happens when 
authorities and agencies operate without any form of translucency? In the 
light of signals intelligence and today’s technology, has the right to a private 
life and Rule of Law become obsolete? 
 
I perceived that a part of the shock value of the Snowden- leaks stemmed 
from the fact that highly democratic governments allegedly employed 
methods and rhetoric which had previously been associated with states of 
lesser democratic fulfilment. Living in a single-party state at the time, I had 
seen what Rule of Law meant in China. After July 2013, however, I started 
                                                 
1
 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/exposed-australias-asia-spy-
network-20131030-2whia.html. 
2
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/03/nsa-asked-spying-congress-bernie-
sanders. 
3
 http://www.publikt.se/artikel/riksdagen-vill-ha-besked-av-fra-46647. 
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to doubt whether the above listed questions had a different meaning if the 
involved state was a democracy or not. To find out, I decided to perform 
this study from a Western democratic perspective, assessing the intelligence 
exchanges between the US, the UK, Sweden and Germany from an 
accountability perspective. 
 
Since the terror attacks of 9/11 2001, states around the world have given 
broader and broader mandates to their respective intelligence agencies. 
America and her allies provide ample examples. These include the USA 
Patriot Act which validates information searches without probable cause 
4
; 
Sweden’s Försvarets Radio Anstalt (FRA) - law which gives the domestic 
security agency the authority to surveil cable- borne data (including large 
parts of telephone and internet transmissions)
5
; and the UK’s 2003 
amendments to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) which 
extend the number of legal entities with access to intercepted data.
 6 
States 
understood the importance of proportionality between what the measures 
aimed at achieving and the rights which would suffer as a consequence, but 
argued that such measures were necessary to adapt their defences to new 
forms of threats. Although Sweden reported to be a highly unlikely target of 
terrorism, the executive branch argued that measures were needed to be 
taken as foreign interests in Sweden might be at risk, and to rule out the 
possibility for terrorists to use Sweden for logistical reasons to access 
targets abroad.
7
  
 
As such, the 9/ 11- attacks served as a catalyst to take intelligence 
acquisition into a new direction where international cooperation, rather than 
sovereign competence, was necessary. It also evoked noticeable alliance 
rhetoric in the western world, as Sweden explicitly undertook measures to 
protect foreign interests. Alliances and extended mandates to the security 
agencies were formed in the name of counter- terrorism efforts. However, 
they have also reportedly been abused by signatory powers asking allies to 
spy on their own population without suffering legal consequences from 
violating articles upholding the individual’s right to privacy, most notably 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
8
 Evidence 
also suggests that intelligence exchange cooperation has facilitated 
unilateral violations of human rights and principles of international law. One 
example of this is the US bugging of the German Chancellor. Such 
behaviour is unacceptable on a number of legal points (which shall be 
explained), yet the US- or any other state involved in circumventing its legal 
obligations- has not suffered any judicial consequences for its actions. To 
me this indicates that the current framework of signals intelligence 
acquisition and exchange is legally unsatisfactory in a democratic society, 
and intrinsically motivates a discussion on accountability within the field. 
 
                                                 
4
 USA Patriot Act, section 215. 
5
 SFS 2008:717, article 2. 
6
 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.co.uk/definition/Regulation-of-Investigatory-Powers-Act. 
7
 Prop. 2005/06:177, s. 27 f.. 
8
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/655996.stm. 
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1.1 Aim and Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the need for regional frameworks (such 
as EU- conventions or organs) when it comes to signals intelligence, in 
order to protect other areas of great interest to the EU, such as human rights 
and governmental accountability. The paper achieves this aim by answering 
the following questions: 
 
 To what extent do the current legal frameworks regarding 
information exchange between the US and her European allies 
enable states to circumvent international, regional and civil legal 
obligations? 
 How would regional frameworks help in enforcing accountability 
onto states in breach of their international and civil rights 
obligations?  
 
The importance of the study stems from the novelty of the situation as we 
know it today: reports on the magnitude of the US- European intelligence 
exchanges and the legal and ethical power abuse derived from that 
exchange, have only recently seen the light of day and continue yet to grow 
in numbers. Therefore, research on the topic is yet sparse and needs to 
increase. Moreover, it is a topic which directly involves and affects billions 
of citizens whether one is an active target of surveillance or not. This has 
been substantiated by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the 
case of Weber and Saravia vs. Germany, which argued that ‘legislation 
permitting a system for effecting secret surveillance of communications 
involves a threat of surveillance’9, whether it is implemented or not. In 
1975, Senator and lawyer Frank Church forebodingly argued that the power 
held by the National Security Agency (NSA) was so great that if it went 
unchecked, it could ‘make tyranny total’10 for the whole of the US citizenry 
and fundamentally change human behavior in how we communicate with 
each other. The current close cooperation between the NSA and foreign 
agencies should thus present a similar interest in transparency and 
accountability, in all respective domestic operations. The subject remains 
highly confidential in nature, which inevitably limits the sources accessible 
to the public. However, that does not take away from the value of the study 
as Rule of Law is, and must be, for all citizens. 
 
Transcending the context of surveillance, citizens and states have a natural 
interest in discussing and elucidating accountability for authorities and 
agencies. Accountability is a basic part and requirement of Rule of Law. 
This, in turn, has proven to be a fundamental building block of Western 
society. One example of this is that membership of the EU requires 
fulfillment of the Copenhagen- criteria which assert Rule of Law to 
                                                 
9
 Weber and Saravia vs. Germany §144. 
10
 Sloan, Lawrence D: ‘ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals Intelligence: A 
Need for Reevaluation’. In: Duke Law Journal vol. 50 no. 5, Durham, North Carolina 2001, 
p. 1467. 
 10 
represent a certain level of democracy, respect for human rights and stability 
of state institutions.
11
 The United States Constitution does not expressly 
mention Rule of Law, but the doctrine is seen elsewhere in virtually all 
public undertakings as all government officers, including the President, the 
judiciary, and all members of Congress, vow to uphold the supremacy of the 
Constitution to any power an individual might have.
12
 
 
On a broader note, the subject can also serve as a valuable point of argument 
in discussing the position which international law holds today: shortly after 
his instatement, president Obama asserted to the United Nations Security 
Council that ‘international law is not an empty promise’.13 Yet, in the 
acquisition of signals intelligence, conventions such as the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations are being thwarted without legal 
consequence, not least by the US. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The study uses a classical legal method to assess the material at hand, 
explaining the significance of law, legislative history and case- law to the 
intelligence exchange. Jurisprudence and additional doctrine of legal 
philosophy have also been employed, particularly in elucidating principles 
of Rule of Law and how they correspond to signals intelligence. Moreover, 
elements of a comparative approach are found in the analysis of the work, as 
the study of different legislatures lends itself well to assess issues which 
might stem from similar patterns, or differences, between them. 
 
As for the legislation regarding the exchange of signals intelligence, the 
study looks at three different levels of regulations: international law, 
regional (EU) law and the individual exchange between the US and Sweden, 
the UK and Germany. In international law, the study looks at principles of 
customary law and the regulations of conventions (such as the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)) of which all interested parties are 
members.
14
 In regional law, relevant EU- regulations and cases are 
accounted for. In the bilateral exchange between nations, the stipulations of 
the exchange agreements are assessed.  
 
                                                 
11
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf p. 
13. 
12
 Vile, John R: A Companion to the United States Constitution and its Amendments, 
Westport, Connecticut 2006 p. 80. 
13
 http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/09/24/international-law-not-empty-promise. 
14
 See https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
3&chapter=3&lang=en, and: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
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Materially, the study touches upon subjects which have been studied to 
various degrees. The discussion of power abuse and the need for regional 
frameworks in signals intelligence is rooted in a discourse of accountability, 
whose parameters have been amply analysed in the literature of Aleksander 
Peczenik. In On Law and Reason, Peczenik presents comprehensive 
arguments for the necessity of responsibility of those in power as a building 
block of democracy.
15
 He maintains that criminal responsibility of officials 
for abuse of power promotes democracy; however, he also notes the 
vagueness of the term ‘democracy’ and that it might have different levels of 
fulfilment.
16
 
 
Moreover, fundamental principles of international law which hold relevance 
to the field, such as the principle of non- intervention, have been discussed 
to a large extent over the years. The study bases its findings in this regard on 
the work of Malcolm N. Shaw’s International Law. Matters of the division 
of powers within the EU are assessed primarily through official EU 
documents and a hearing with European Court of Human Rights judge 
Bostjan Zupančič, which was held in 2013 after the Snowden exposures to 
discuss what the EU can do when domestic agencies are in unethical cahoots 
with foreign powers, under the current EU- treaty.  
 
However, sources regarding the actual state of the current exchange of 
signals intelligence are considerably sparser. The reasons behind this are 
two: the subject is characterized by a high level of secrecy, which means 
that the majority of the information regarding state surveillance is 
unreachable to the public. Furthermore, the insight which the Snowden 
leaks provided on the matter is still so fresh that substantial academic 
research has not had enough time to surface. As such, the study must 
employ online journals and other internet sources to some extent in order to 
get the most up to date information in an area which is still experiencing 
ripples on the water by the new findings. Moreover, since Snowden limited 
his transmittance of classified documents to newspapers the Guardian and 
the Washington Post, the archives of these sources have to be explored via 
the internet to access the original publication site of the material. German 
newspaper Der Spiegel is also a prolific writer on the subject, and is, as 
such, employed to some extent. The online databases of the NSA homepage 
are also accessed to reach the UKUSA agreement which was only 
publicized there and in the National Archives in the UK. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
In order to make the study’s proportions manageable, only one aspect of 
Rule of Law will be dealt with in- depth: accountability. Several other 
aspects hold undisputable relevance to the field and the meaning of 
                                                 
15
 Peczenik, Aleksander: ‘On Law and Reason’, Lund 1989. In: Law and Philosophy 
Library vol. 8, Dordrecht 2009, p. 27. 
16
 Ibid.  
 12 
accountability itself, and consequently need to be mentioned. However, 
accountability was chosen as the focus of this thesis, because in order for 
the right to privacy and international law to acquire true substance and be 
something more than ’an empty promise’, accountability must desperately 
be enforced in situations where there seemingly is none. Additionally, there 
are many different interpretations of Rule of Law, but accountability seems 
to be too central to the doctrine to be overlooked as a matter of 
interpretation.  
 
Furthermore, the study focuses on accountability within the specified realm 
of signal intelligence exchange between countries, and thus not within 
domestic operations. Therefore, the study is one of international law, 
although some domestic regulations must be accounted for, as they have 
international implications. In all material assessed and in all the cited court- 
cases, only the substance which is relevant to international aspects of 
accountability will be accounted for.  
 
Moreover, the study is limited in the exchanges assessed. It looks at the 
intelligence exchange between the US and its EU- allies because they share 
common democratic values and rights of the individual. As such, there is a 
common legal culture which lends itself to an investigation in terms of 
accountability. Looking at, and comparing, countries of vastly different 
legal cultures would still be valuable and interesting, but would not fit the 
scope of this study. The US was chosen as it is the most powerful actor in 
the field; the UK was chosen as it is a prolific ally and partner to the US in 
intelligence operations; Sweden was chosen because of its status as an 
active partner of the NSA and the study’s connection to Lund University; 
and Germany was chosen because of the highly interesting incident 
involving the US bugging of Angela Merkel’s phone and its aftermath. 
However, it is also important to note that several other states are active in 
the field of surveillance, but currently lack the technological capacity and 
competence of the chosen countries of this study. This might not be the case 
for long, though. As such, investigating the accountability of the US, the 
UK, Sweden and Germany is interesting in that it might set an example of 
what is to be considered tolerable conduct by emerging global powers in the 
future. 
 
In terms of the material assessed, limitations were made due to the value of 
some categories of legal sources. The study does not, for example, look at 
United Nations Security Council resolutions as two of the assessed countries 
hold permanent seats and a right of veto in the Security Council. 
Consequently, such resolutions would be unlikely to bind the US or the UK 
to terms unfavourable for themselves, and they would not have come into 
being on the same terms for all of the assessed countries. 
1.4 Disposition 
The study begins in chapter 2 with defining what signals intelligence entails, 
and why nations across the world employ it. Discovering the purpose behind 
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agencies’ operations holds direct relevance to its lawfulness, as various legal 
frameworks demand that usage of data should always be bound, and judged, 
by the parameters of the purpose of its collection. Those legal frameworks 
will be further explained in subsequent chapters of the thesis, primarily 
Chapter 4 and 5. 
 
Chapter 3 assesses what role accountability plays as an instrument of Rule 
of Law within signals intelligence acquisition. More specifically, it 
discusses what requirements the doctrine of accountability pose on 
surveillance operations, and how those requirements’ fulfilment is 
fundamental in democratic societies such as the US, the UK, Sweden and 
Germany. 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the international legal frameworks for data collection 
across borders. It talks about the application of the ICCPR and the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations as well as the grounds for jurisdiction 
for the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the principle of non- 
intervention in international customary law. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the relevant EU regulations on the matter, 
comprehensively assessing the significance of treaties, directives and cases 
to signals intelligence and its exchange. 
 
Chapter 6 assesses the specific exchange agreements and examples of power 
abuse in light of the exchange, between the US and UK, Sweden and 
Germany. 
 
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of the assessed material and concludes the 
work by evaluating whether or not the existing legal frameworks are 
satisfactory in upholding the degree of accountability which is required of 
them, or if regional frameworks would present a better solution in a 
democratic society which values respect for human rights and Rule of Law. 
 
In this fashion, key concepts are first explained while the range of legal 
application becomes narrower and more specified as the thesis progresses 
from international, to regional, to bilateral frameworks.  
 14 
2 The meaning and purpose of 
signals intelligence 
acquisition 
This chapter commences the material assessment of the thesis. It outlines 
what signals intelligence acquisition means, and some key aspects of the 
security agencies’ domestic mandates. The domestic mandates are important 
to account for in an international legal study, as they have international 
implications as soon as a bilateral exchange treaty is set up which involves 
one of the agencies. Ensuring an understanding of signals intelligence 
acquisition is pivotal to understanding the subject matter of the bigger legal 
issue at hand. Moreover, such an assessment is necessary to commence the 
work with, as the material presented in subsequent chapters will be 
evaluated from the vantage point of the concepts presented herein.  
 
To get some range of the definitions, and to clarify that the concept is not 
entirely unambiguous, two sources are consulted as to the meaning of 
signals intelligence: the American army and the Swedish government. 
Furthermore, the mandates of the American, British, Swedish and German 
intelligence agencies are accounted for, as they represent states of 
comparable democratic values. 
 
2.1 Defining signals intelligence 
 
The United States Army defines signals intelligence as: 
 
 ‘1. A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in 
combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, 
and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however 
transmitted.  
2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign 
instrumentation signals.’17 
 
This constitutes a very broad area of application as it more or less entails all 
information which can be obtained from any means of communication. As 
such, given this definition, signals intelligence is something which states 
have been doing for centuries.
18
 The Swedish government, however, defines 
the term as ‘acquisition of signals in electronic form’19, which is obviously a 
narrower definition. The definition also specifies that these signals can be 
                                                 
17
 Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,  Joint Publication 
1-02, 2010 (amended through March 2014), p. 240. 
18
 http://www.trft.org/TRFTpix/spies9eR2006.pdf. 
19
 SOU 2009:66 p.47. 
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accessed through a range of media such as ‘cables, links or radio waves’20 
and distinguishes between close- range surveillance (domestic) and far- 
reaching surveillance (signals collected abroad).
21
 In any event, it can be 
said that the term denotes gathering of information through intercepted data. 
 
The collection of signals intelligence seemingly started with strictly military 
motives: one could protect one’s homeland through gaining knowledge of 
the enemy’s next plan of attack.22 However, the usage of surveillance for a 
variety of reasons boomed in the prelude to the Cold War, which is 
illustrated by the establishment of the NSA in 1952 and the Swedish FRA in 
1942, and has continued to entail, for example, surveillance of economic 
programs and domestic politics.
23
 
 
2.2 Purposes of the domestic intelligence 
agencies 
The modern, and extended, reasons for signals intelligence acquisition are 
closely related to the regulated objectives of the domestic agencies. Indeed, 
the US Executive Order 12,333 gives the NSA sole responsibility for signals 
intelligence
24
, and states that ‘information [about the capabilities, intentions 
and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their  
agents] is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative 
and responsible manner [...]’.25 Because of this loose mandate, the NSA is 
seemingly granted means of surveillance on any matter regarding any 
‘activity’ abroad. Such activities have been proven to include domestic 
economic policy, ideological debates and political disputes. The NSA 
primarily targets foreign intelligence; however, it has been reported that 
strictly American communication has been processed without a warrant as 
well, through a process which is called ‘incidental collection’, sanctioned by 
Section 702 of the FAA.
26
 Members of Congress have been repeatedly 
denied clarifications as to the details of the surveillance programs, and to 
what scale it scans American citizens’ correspondence.27 
 
Act 2008:717 of Sweden contains a long list of tasks for the FRA. This 
includes surveillance of a range of situations which are of interest to protect 
Sweden from international terrorism or military threats. However, it also 
includes the more general point 8 of the first article which empowers the 
FRA to pursue surveillance on ‘foreign powers’ actions or intentions of 
essential interest to Swedish foreign-, security- or military policy’. Such an 
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email-calls. 
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interest could thus, theoretically, be economical as long as it is of interest to 
Swedish foreign policy. Moreover, article 2a states that signals must not be 
gathered from communications where sender and receiver are both located 
in Sweden. Critics to the law have noted, however, that this protection is 
broken as soon as the information is transported through, or stored in, 
technological infrastructure abroad. As an example, if a sender in Sweden 
sends an e-mail that goes through servers or cables abroad, to a recipient 
who is also located in Sweden, the FRA will be legally capable to intercept 
the data.
28
 If one takes into account the Swedish market penetration of 
domains with foreign servers it becomes clear that the exception to the rule 
that domestic regards staggering amounts of data. 
 
Swedish law also states that FRA has the capacity to establish agreements of 
cooperation with other countries and international organizations.
29
 
 
The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) of the UK 
operates under the 1994 Intelligence Services Act (section 3). Therein, 
article 2 stipulates that the GCHQ shall pursue surveillance: 
 
(a) in the interests of national security, with particular reference to 
the defence and foreign policies of Her Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom; or 
(b) in the interests of the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom in relation to the actions or intentions of persons outside 
the British Islands; or 
(c) in support of the prevention or detection of serious crime. 
 
This also constitutes a wide range of application for the British intelligence 
acquisition effort. The GCHQ’s budget is undisclosed, and the agency did 
not officially exist until 1982.
30
 
 
The German BND operates under the BNDG- act, whose first article 
stipulates that the BND collects signals intelligence of importance to 
Germany’s foreign policy and security policy. In this mandate, it has been 
regulated that information can only be exchanged to prevent serious crime 
such as murder, and crimes against democracy or public security.
31
 
 
As EU-states, Germany, UK and Sweden have, to some extent, limited 
possibilities to intercept their own respective populations’ data, as signatory 
states to ECHR (art. 8). The significance of this will be further explained in 
Chapter 5 and 6.  
                                                 
28
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 SFS 2000:130 § 3. 
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3 Accountability and its 
relation to Rule of Law and 
democracy 
This chapter provides the jurisprudential foundation for what demands 
democracy puts on security agencies and the legislation which forms their 
mandates. This discussion is pertinent in relation to the previous chapter 
which outlines broad mandates for the security agencies, and compromised 
governmental insight into their operations; however, it is also of particular 
relevance to the US, the UK, Sweden and Germany, as these societies are 
paradigms of the democratic world. Many states around the world (such as 
China and Russia) have a prolific SIGNIT presence on the international 
arena, but are generally not thought to be defined by the parameters of 
democracy to the same extent as the above mentioned countries. The chapter 
provides a theoretical framework against which the substantive legislation 
put forward in Chapter 4, 5 and 6 are assessed. The following principles are 
applicable to all areas of legislation. They are accounted for in this thesis to 
accentuate that their compromise in any governmental area forms a threat 
against democracy.  
 
3.1 The academic discourse on the 
meaning of Rule of Law 
The United Nations, the key actor in the effort to safeguard and codify 
international law, states that the promotion of Rule of Law is at the very 
core of its mission.
32
 The organization maintains that the way to durable 
peace and human rights goes through respect for Rule of Law.
33
 But what 
does that mean in reality? Renowned Harvard professor Fuller created a list 
of requirements for Rule of Law in his legal classic ‘The Morality of Law’. 
These state that Rule of Law is upheld when 1) The society has rules, 2) the 
rules regulate future behavior (banning retrospective legislation), 3) The 
rules are public 4) the rules are understandable, 5) the rules are not 
internally contradictory, 6) the rules must be possible to obey, 7) the rules 
are not subject to constant change, and 8) there is an accord between the 
rules which have been publicized and the ones that are implemented in 
practice.
34
 However, Fuller has garnered criticism for this list as it does not 
take into account any moral aspect as to the substantive quality of the law. 
Advocates of a stricter perception of Rule of Law have stated that a ‘thin’ or 
formalist view is not enough; rules should also be ethically acceptable in 
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33
 Ibid. 
34
 Fuller, Lon: Morality of Law, New Haven, Connecticut. 1969, p. 39. 
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order to qualify for the accomplishment of Rule of Law.
35
 One of these 
scholars is Peczenik. According to him, Rule of Law has intrinsic relations 
to democracy which he measures by a number of criteria. Legal 
accountability (or ‘responsibility of those in power’ as Peczenik also calls it) 
is one of said criteria.
36
  
 
Rule of Law is nearly always contrasted by its antithesis: Rule of Man. Rule 
of Man signifies that any given man (often a dictator), is placed above the 
legal regime.
37
 As such, he may legislate without moral consideration and 
make himself untouchable by the same legal standards which he sets for 
others. Fittingly, this is also the exact antithesis of democracy. By contrast, 
the complete fulfillment of Rule of Law, as it is often interpreted, can be 
said to have accountability at its core, as no person is above the law: the 
law, and nothing but the law, rules the state.
38
 As such, all citizens are 
equally accountable before the law. 
 
On a broad note, it can be said that accountability is an intrinsic effect of 
democracy too, as parliaments which make unpopular decisions will simply 
not be re-elected. As such, they are held accountable to the general 
electorate. This is called informal responsibility.
39
 However, a problem with 
this statement is that it relies on that citizens are well aware of the decisions 
which the governmental organs make in their name.
40
 Another kind of 
responsibility is the criminal accountability of officials for power abuse, or 
formal responsibility. This can exist to various degrees. An example of this 
is the Swedish constitution regarding the position of ministers of 
government and Justices of the Supreme Court. According to RF 13:3, a 
minister of government can only be prosecuted for crimes within his or her 
ministerial role, if the crime has meant a severe mishandling of his or her 
duties. Similarly, RF 11:7 stipulates very severe demands for separating a 
court judge from his or her office.
41
 Moreover, one person in the Swedish 
legal realm holds complete legal immunity: the Head of State.
 
The 
implications that this has on Rule of Law will be further discussed below. 
 
Accountability is not always easily extracted from other criteria of Rule of 
Law. For example, for informal responsibility to be effective there has to be 
a certain level of political participation by the citizens; to put it short, they 
need to vote. This is something which Peczenik identifies as a separate 
criterion. 
42
 
 
Moreover, accountability interacts with yet another criterion: legal certainty. 
If one returns to the above mentioned example, it might seem like Sweden is 
not a democracy, as Peczenik argues that accountability is a prerequisite for 
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democracy, and Sweden seemingly has quite a few exceptions to the general 
rules of accountability. It even has a Head of State who is completely 
immune to any prosecution; something which seems to come eerily close to 
the above stated description of Rule of Man, exemplified through a dictator. 
Most credible sources on the subject, however, rates Sweden as one of the 
most democratic countries on the planet.
43
 One of the reasons for this is, as 
suggested, that there are varying degrees of fulfillment of the doctrine 
regarding accountability and therefore also varying degrees of democracy. 
Another reason is because of accountability’s close connection to legal 
certainty. It is true that not everyone can be held legally accountable on the 
same premises in Sweden, since the head of State is legally immune. 
However, the Head of State is not legally immune due to some arbitrary 
exercise of authority; he is immune because the law, which has been 
consciously and publicly crafted by representatives of the people, states so. 
As such, there is a high degree of transparency and legal certainty as to what 
legal position the Head of State has, which seems to mitigate the potential 
lack of fulfillment of accountability. It is interesting to note that this might 
present something of a paradox: the Head of State is above the law since he 
cannot be convicted or prosecuted; however, since this immunity is in itself 
granted by law, does that not, in fact, consequently make him and his rights 
subject to law like everyone else? If the law grants him his rights, it should 
also be able to take them away. 
 
According to Peczenik, one must distinguish between ‘legal certainty’ and 
‘predictability of legal decisions’.44 He states that predictability of legal 
decisions simply means that the rules which exist are followed in a 
predictable manner (not unlike the eight criterion on Fuller’s list), whereas 
legal certainty must come with a moral acceptability of the rules 
themselves.
45
 The reason behind this, he states, is ‘the fact that the 
interpretation and application of law is to some extent rational and, for that 
reason, promotes legal certainty in material sense, that is, the optimal 
compromise between predictability of legal decisions and their acceptability 
in view of other moral considerations’.46 As an example, he argues that Jews 
in Nazi- Germany possessed a high degree of predictability of legal 
decisions, since they knew that they would be discriminated against, but not 
a high degree of legal certainty, as the rules behind the treatment were 
insufficiently sound from a moral perspective.
47
 This reasoning is, as 
Peczenik himself states, optimal in theory, but constitutes some issues in 
reality. Morality, for example, has many different meanings in different 
cultures, and varies depending on the individual interpreter of the legal 
text.
48
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3.2 Problems in evaluating situations in 
terms of Rule of Law 
 
As may be noted from the assessment above, establishing parameters for 
concepts within Rule of Law is difficult. Essential terms such as democracy 
and accountability are not only elusive to define as they seem to come with 
varying degrees of fulfillment, but they are also subjective. Peczenik and 
other scholars note that there is a plethora of different definitions of 
democracy; some of which do not even explicitly count accountability as a 
criterion.
49
 This has also been one of the key criticisms toward the discourse 
of Rule of Law. Indeed, Richard H Fallon of the Columbia Law Review 
notes that the argument of Rule of Law is a rhetorically powerful one, but 
that the precise meaning of the term remains ‘less clear than ever before’50, 
as scholars have taken the discourse into too many different directions, 
citing different criteria as prerequisites, providing different degrees of 
tolerance to the exceptions of rules, and blurring the line between legal 
demands and political righteousness.
51
 Moreover, it has been said that the 
general academic discourse on the subject has been vague to the extent that 
all states can comfortably agree on the pursuit of Rule of Law, while it has 
also lead to disagreement and misunderstandings, because of the lack of 
precise wordings and uniform requirements.
52
 It has even been said that 
‘probably no legal system realizes any of the desiderata perfectly’, 53  from 
the vantage point of a substantive understanding of Rule of Law, which 
creates the problem of not having a concrete measuring stick of the concept.  
 
However, Fallon also notes that even though accountability is not always a 
given criterion of democracy, it is too much at the core of the term Rule of 
Law to be passed off as all- subjective.
54
  
 
3.3 The application of accountability in 
relation to signals intelligence 
So what does the above mean specifically to the field of signals intelligence 
acquisition and exchange? Who are the legal subjects of accountability and 
how should the doctrine be enforced? 
 
As Chapter 2 established, the domestic security agencies generally operate 
to protect the standing of the state against foreign threats, or to prevent 
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crime on a national level. Their mandates are provided in national law and 
subject to governance. Therefore, they are actors of the states. Thus, when a 
security agency operates outside its mandate or operates on an illicit 
mandate, the state is to be held accountable for its actions. In terms of state 
accountability in signals intelligence operations, two situations are of 
relevance: the first is when a citizenry holds its domestic state accountable 
for power abuse, and the second is when a state holds another state 
accountable for trespasses pertaining to the first state’s territory or interests. 
 
In a society governed by Rule of Law, the courts are the executive branch of 
the legislative process, whereas the parliament is never involved in the 
application of its rules on individual situations.
55
 Consequently, the 
courtroom becomes the arena in which accountability is enforced. As such, 
exercising accountability entails having the means of litigation, at least in 
terms of formal responsibility. This presents a big problem in the secretive 
field of signals intelligence, as legislation and exchange agreements are 
often undisclosed. For how can there be any contractual accountability, 
when the public is not aware of the contract?  
 
However, accountability can also be enforced outside the courtroom through 
informal responsibility. Undisclosed contracts further weaken the premises 
on which the public can exercise political participation, as they will not be 
able to make fully informed decisions as voters, which in hand will 
jeopardize the informal responsibility of the government. 
 
Furthermore, if one adopts a substantive perspective of Rule of Law and  
accepts the intrinsic relationship accountability has to legal certainty, it is 
not enough that there are enforced rules regarding what states can and 
cannot do within their intelligence exchange treaties; the treaties should also 
have morally sound contents, and be constructed from a tolerably ethical 
vantage point.  
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4 International law regarding 
international surveillance 
As the theoretical aspects of Rule of Law have been accounted for in the 
previous chapter, the study can now go on to assess substantive law’s 
demands on surveillance operations and accountability, to later evaluate if 
these substantive frameworks are adequate in the analysis of the thesis. This 
chapter assesses the international legal framework. 
 
The actors of international law are generally states. Even though a sizeable 
portion of the human rights doctrine revolves around rights of the 
individual, individuals generally lack legal competence to assert breaches of 
international treaties without a protest by the state of nationality.
56
 As such, 
this section of the thesis revolves around the accountability states may 
enforce onto other states for unlawful international surveillance. 
 
4.1 Applicable conventions 
 
All of the assessed countries in this thesis are ratified signatures to the 
ICCPR.
57
 As a substantive rule of international law, article 17 of the ICCPR 
stipulates that ‘no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy […] or correspondence’.58 ‘Correspondence’ 
has, by other international organs such as the ECtHR, been defined as a 
broad concept including electronic transmittance and telephone calls.
59
 
‘Arbitrary’, in this regard, refers to action which is not regulated by legal 
processes.
60
 Therefore, it means that the surveillance must have grounds 
stated in law. The preamble of the covenant states that the rights which are 
enshrined therein are universal to all of mankind; however, article 2 
proclaims that it is up to each and every signatory state to ensure those 
rights for its own citizens. Therefore, the convention primarily safeguards 
rights of domestic citizens toward their state, rather than from foreign 
attacks. However, this does not mean that states are powerless when another 
state breaches the convention in relation to their own population. As will be 
explained below, when states enter treaties with a multitude of parties (such 
as the ICCPR), that state has the obligation to all other states who are 
signatories of the same convention, to fulfill its duties in relation to its 
citizenry. 
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As will be revealed in Chapter 6, quite a few of the surveillance issues 
which have come to light thanks to the Snowden exposés involve the 
diplomatic world, for example when security officials utilize embassies as 
surveillance stations. Therefore, it is in order to assess the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which all interested states are 
parties.
61
 This protects free communications on the part of the diplomatic 
mission for official purposes, but also states in its 27
th
 article that wireless 
transmitters can only be installed and used by the mission with the consent 
of the receiving state. Furthermore, article 41 (1) holds that all holders of 
privileges and immunities in light of the convention (primarily diplomats) 
shall respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state, and shall not 
interfere with the internal affairs of said state. The article goes on by further 
cementing that: 
 
The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner 
incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the 
present Convention or by other rules of general international law or 
by any special agreements in force between the sending and the 
receiving State. 
 
The functions of diplomatic missions, as agreed upon by the ratification of 
the convention, are stated in the convention’s third article which holds them 
to mean:  
 
(a) Representing the sending State in the receiving State; 
(b) Protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State 
and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law; 
(c) Negotiating with the Government of the receiving State; 
(d) Ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in 
the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the 
sending State; 
(e) Promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the 
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and 
scientific relations. 
 
If a state finds itself injured by another party under the Convention, it can 
enforce state responsibility and accountability through the draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) 
article 42 and thus demand a cessation of the internationally wrongful act. 
 
As all of the assessed states are parties to the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, as well as the ICCPR, they could also press for 
accountability within the framework for erga omnes partes obligations. 
Erga omnes partes means that a state which has signed a treaty has the 
obligation to fulfill its demands toward all signatory states of the same 
treaty.
62
 Thus, a state does not have to be directly injured by another state in 
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order to exercise accountability upon it; it suffices that it has been indirectly 
injured through a breach of the same treaty that itself is a signatory party to. 
This stipulation is moreover substantively laid out in ARSIWA article 48 (1) 
a. Through this stipulation the indirectly injured states can also demand ‘the 
cessation of the internationally wrongful act’ according to ARSIWA article 
48 (2) a. 
 
However, in order to exercise state responsibility through litigation in the 
ICJ, the ICJ has to have grounds to jurisdiction. This can be fulfilled 
through one of the following grounds: 
 
1) An existing treaty between the processing parties which gives the 
court jurisdiction in relation to a certain type of cases
63
 
2) Unilateral declarations from the processing states to the court, which 
together give the court jurisdiction. These can be specified to apply 
to certain types of cases or certain time- frames. If the other 
processing state has a contract with ICJ regarding a similar type of 
case for the same time-frame, the court has jurisdiction.
64
 
3) A treaty in force between the parties which gives jurisdiction to 
PCIJ, which was established through the League of Nations, and 
whose jurisdiction was later transferred to the ICJ.
65
 
4) Unilateral declarations from the processing states to the PCIJ 
regarding a specific type of litigation, similar to the second ground 
for jurisdiction.
66
  
 
Through article 1 of the Optional Protocol of the Vienna Conventions on 
Diplomatic Relations, states have yielded automatic jurisdiction to the ICJ 
as to disputes which might arise pertaining to the Convention. All assessed 
states have ratified the Optional Protocol.
67
 
68
 
 
4.2 International customary law 
 
Accountability can also be enforced through international customary law, 
and more specifically, the principle of non- intervention. This is a principle 
which stems from the international legal doctrines of the right to self- 
determination and the principle of sovereignty, which solidify that a state 
enjoys (as a rule) sole authority over its territory and its residing 
population.
69
 Consequently, states have an internationally established right 
to handle domestic issues as they see fit. These issues may be cultural, 
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economical, political or social.
70
 This prerogative comes with a counter- 
obligation for foreign states, to not interfere with the handling of those 
issues. In terms of what constitutes an unlawful intervention, the ICJ stated 
in the Nicaragua- case that the term has an ‘element of coercion’71 at its 
core. Furthermore, to elucidate the matter, the Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Self- Determination cites a definition by Oppenheim’s International Law 
which cements that ‘the interference must be forcible or dictatorial, or 
otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the state intervened against of control 
over the matter in question. Interference pure and simple is not 
intervention’.72 
 
What this means, specifically, in relation to international SIGINT operations 
is difficult to tell; especially considering a lack of international case- law in 
the field. However, it should be safe to interpret the above statement to 
mean that sole SIGINT acquisition is not enough to constitute a breach of 
the principle of non- intervention; the collected information would have to 
be used in a coercive manner to qualify for such a violation. 
 
 The principle of non- intervention is also substantively enshrined in the UN 
Friendly Relations Declaration, to which all of the assessed states of this 
study are signatory parties, and in article 1 of the ICCPR which cements that 
freedom to pursue economic, social and cultural development comes by 
virtue of all people’s right to self- determination.73 
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5 EU Law and the Council of 
Europe’s framework 
regarding international 
surveillance 
With the broad scope of international substantive law accounted for in the 
previous chapter, the thesis now narrows the focus to regional law, before 
assessing the bilateral treaties in Chapter 6. The chapter outlines the legal 
competence of the EU to regulate intelligence acquisition matters, explains 
the relation between civil rights in a context of Rule of Law and the member 
states’ authority to protect homeland security. Moreover, the chapter closes 
with a discourse of accountability based on effective control, to raise the 
question of when signatory parties to the ECHR (such as the UK, Sweden 
and Germany of this study) can be held responsible for deeds conducted 
outside of its traditional jurisdiction.  
 
5.1 The Treaty of the EU and the Data 
Protection Directive’s application to 
SIGINT 
 
The principle of state sovereignty is a corner stone in EU law. Hence, article 
4 (2) of the Treaty of the EU states that national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each member state. Because the intelligence agencies of the 
assessed countries were created with the legal mandate to protect national 
security, the issue of signals intelligence falls into a category which the EU 
cannot specifically legislate over. However, the EU still has a strong legal 
competence in fields which are of direct relevance to signals intelligence 
acquisition, particularly the human right to privacy. 
 
Another important legal framework within the EU regarding surveillance is 
the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC which safeguards transparency in 
the field, as article 7 of the directive demands certain prerequisites which 
promote a consent-regulated processing of data. However, as for the signals 
intelligence agencies, requisite (e) of the same article provides them with 
enough lee-way to collect data in the name of national security:  
 
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed 
only if […] 
 (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out 
in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in 
the controller or in a third party to whom the data are disclosed […] 
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5.2 The European Convention on Human 
Rights’ application to SIGINT 
 
The UK, Sweden, Germany as well as the EU are signatory parties to the 
ECHR.
74
 In this catalogue of human rights, article 8 (1) states that ‘everyone 
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
correspondence’. ‘Correspondence’, in this regard, includes letters along 
with other deliveries such as telephonic and telegraphic communications as 
well as transferring of messages by radio and computers.
75
 However, the 
protection can be infringed upon as long as it is ‘in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.76 Interesting to note here is 
the connection to democracy and what that means in terms of Rule of Law. 
 
Claims regarding the infringement upon article 8 of the ECHR in terms of 
surveillance often also entail a violation of article 13: the right to an 
effective remedy before national authorities. Since a lot of intelligence 
acquisition efforts are clouded in secrecy, it can be extremely difficult for 
civilians to substantiate the violation, often meaning impossibility for 
plaintiffs to achieve success in court.
77
  
 
5.2.1 Case- law elucidating the boundaries of 
ECHR art. 8 (2) 
The short and very condensed presentation of the cases below is featured in 
this thesis, not because of what it says about the respective countries’ 
domestic security legislation, but because of the standard which the ECHR 
sets for transparency and accountability in surveillance operations in 
general.  
 
5.2.1.1 Weber and Saravia vs Germany 
 
What article 8 means in terms of signals intelligence has been substantiated 
by a healthy amount of cases in the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). One of these is Weber and Saravia vs Germany in which a 
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German journalist and a citizen of Uruguay argued that they had been 
subject to a German breach of the ECHR, particularly articles 8 and 13. 
They had, among other types of communications, had their telephone 
correspondence intercepted by the BND. The court highlighted the 
importance of protecting freedom of expression and freedom of press in a 
democratic society, particularly in relation to journalistic sources.
78
 In 
assessing whether or not article 8 of the ECHR had been infringed upon, the 
court stated that ‘the mere existence of legislation which allows a system for 
the secret monitoring of communications entails a threat of surveillance for 
all those to whom the legislation may be applied’.79 Therefore, the 
principles in article 8 (1) had been interfered. However, the court also noted 
the importance of the permissible grounds for conducting otherwise illicit 
surveillance in the second paragraph of the article; maintaining that the 
grounds for intercepting communications must be stated in national law and 
hold a certain level of democratic quality to them. This means (at least) that 
legislation has to be accessible for those whom it applies to, so that they can 
foresee the consequences which it entails. The reasoning behind these 
statements was cast in a direct application of Rule of Law principles by the 
court.
80
 Moreover, the court held that previous case- law had developed 
certain minimum standards for what the domestic legislation should contain 
in order to be considered democratically passable: the legislation has to 
specify what nature of offence might warrant interception of 
communications, what categories of people who are targeted by SIGINT 
operations, how long telephone bugging can last, and how the intercepted 
data should be examined, used, stored and erased.
81
 
 
In the present case, the court came to the conclusion that Germany had not 
violated the ECHR as the German legislation had sufficiently specified what 
crimes it was meant to prevent, and its targeted groups.
82
 The 
communications between the plaintiffs had been intercepted according to 
those provisions. Moreover, the legislation was open to the public which 
meant that the plaintiffs had had a reasonable chance to foresee what sort of 
effects their actions would have in light of the legislation.
83
 Thus, the 
legislation’s transparency and motivated cause was deemed sufficiently 
qualitative in a democratic society. 
 
5.2.1.2 Liberty and others vs United Kingdom 
 
Another case regarding article 8 in terms of surveillance is Liberty and 
others vs. UK. The subject matter of the case was the secret surveillance by 
the British Ministry of Defense of three British and Irish organizations’ 
correspondence. The correspondence included sensitive and confidential 
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information, which had been intercepted throughout most of the 1990’s. The 
court reiterated its findings in Weber and Saravia vs Germany, that article 8 
(1) is infringed upon as soon as there exists a system of hidden surveillance, 
and that this constitutes a threat to everyone which the legislation is 
applicable to.
84
 The key to comprehensively assess whether or not that is 
illegal, lies in investigating the validity of the trespass by looking at the 
requisites in 8 (2). 
 
The court found that the GCHQ was given a very generous and vague 
mandate by the national law.
85
 The categories of communication were 
deemed too broad and the situations which warranted surveillance too 
ambiguous to effectively prevent power abuse.
86
 A commissioner was 
tasked to oversee the risk of power-abuse within the work of the agency; 
however, the commissioner’s reports merely stated that the safety- 
procedures were adequate, but what they entailed in reality remained 
undisclosed.
87
 Moreover, the framework of methods with which the agency 
was to store, destroy and examine material and findings was undisclosed to 
the public (because of efficiency reasons). Therefore, the court found that 
the requisites in art. 8 (2) were not fulfilled, and thus held that the 
legislation did not hold a sufficient quality or transparency to it, from a 
democratic perspective.
88
  
 
5.3 Rule of Law as a prerequisite for EU 
membership 
 
The EU’s stance on Rule of Law has been further substantiated beyond case 
precedents. In fact, in order for a state to become a member of the EU, it has 
to fulfill the Copenhagen- criteria. These include ‘stable institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities’.89 As all of the assessed European countries of this 
study are also EU- members, they presumably vouch for the fulfillment of 
these values. 
 
5.4 Accountability within the EU 
In order to exert accountability over EU- states which have overstepped 
their mandates in surveillance, an affected citizen can launch a claim against 
a state through article 34 of the ECHR. This claim must be based on a 
breach of another article in the convention, most likely article 8 when 
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dealing with surveillance. However, article 35 (1) specifies that the 
European Court of Human Rights can only hear a case which has exhausted 
all local remedies. This presents quite a few challenges in reality, especially 
in terms of surveillance, where secretive procedures, legislation and treaties 
make it very difficult for individuals to present comprehensive evidence, or 
to even know that their rights have been violated. Moreover, to litigate all 
the way up to the European Court of Human Rights is often a costly process 
which, in the words of European Court of Human Rights judge Bostjan 
Zupančič, ‘might take years to materialize’.90 
 
Another way to launch a claim against a violating party is if another high 
contracting party litigates through article 33 of the ECHR, meaning an 
interstate case. However, statistics have shown that interstate claims are 
rare. In the history of the ECtHR, there have been 17 interstate 
applications.
91
 The low number of interstate claims could, perhaps, be 
explained by the will to preserve good diplomatic relations. Another reason 
might be the mere difficulty for an outside party to know exactly what 
violations of the ECHR goes on within another state’s territory. 
 
5.4.1 Accountability through effective control of 
other agents: Issa and others vs Turkey 
 
Yet another way to exert accountability over states in breach of the ECHR is 
through a complicated reading of article 1 together with principles 
developed by case- law. This makes ground for accountability of European 
states, even when agents have executed the human rights violations outside 
of its territory, as long as requirements of effective control are fulfilled. 
According to ECtHR judge Bostjan Zupančič, this doctrine of effective 
control should also be applicable to, for example, US agents operating on 
European soil: something of pivotal relevance to signals intelligence 
exchanges.
92
  
 
In Issa and others vs Turkey (Issa), six Iraqi women argued that they lost 
their husbands and sons to Turkish troops in Sarsang near the Turkish 
border. The men and women were practicing their profession as sheep-
herders in the hills when they encountered Turkish solidiers who started to 
abuse the men physically. The soldiers separated the men from the women 
who went back to the village to tell other villagers about the incident. Some 
of the villagers went to Anshki which they knew to be the base of a bigger 
Turkish military unit which was supposed to oversee the military operations 
in the area. There, an officer told them that he had no knowledge of the 
shepherds, but later told members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party that 
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they would be released. On the 3
rd
 of April 1995, the Turkish military left 
the area which meant that the villagers could search for the detained men. 
They were found dead with several bullet-wounds, and severed genitalia.
93
  
 
Because of internally conflicting accounts and ambiguities regarding the 
situation, the court could not cement that Turkey had effective control of the 
area or that the men had, indeed, died by Turkish hands.
94
 Therefore the 
court could not rule that Turkey had violated the ECHR. The case, however, 
came with interesting notions of when states could be accountable ‘within 
their jurisdiction’. The court reminded the parties of the wording of article 1 
ECHR: 
 
 The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of [the] 
Convention.  
 
The key to understanding the relevance which this holds to intelligence 
exchange and accountability is the word ‘jurisdiction’. To understand the 
term, the court looked at principles within public international law, which 
suggests that jurisdiction is primarily territorial, but may also under special 
circumstances be extra- territorial.
95
 In this regard, it stated that ‘a state’s 
responsibility may be engaged where, as a consequence of military action- 
whether lawful or unlawful- that state in practise exercises effective control 
of an area situated outside its national territory’96, and that that control can 
be exercised through subordinate administration.
97
 Moreover ‘effective 
control’ does not necessarily mean detailed control, but can also mean an 
overall level of control.
98
 Furthermore, the court stated that accountability 
can be allocated when a state breaches the rights of people who are still 
under its authority or control, but outside its territory.
99
 This interpretation 
originates from the idea that article 1 ECHR cannot be read as permitting a 
state to commit breaches of the convention on foreign territory, which it 
could not on its own.
100
  
 
The general debate around ’effective control’ in international law stems 
from article 8 of ARSIWA which stipulates:  
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an 
act of a State under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction 
or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct. 
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This has later been substantiated in the Tadić case of ICTY which specified, 
to some extent, what it means to have ‘effective control’. This stipulates that 
‘control by a state […] must comprise more than the mere provision of 
financial assistance or equipment or training’101 as a lower end of the 
spectrum; but further noted that it did not have to go so far as to ‘include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual 
operation’102, on the other end of the spectrum. Somewhere in the middle, it 
suffices that a state ‘has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the 
military actions of the military group, in addition to financing, training and 
equipping or providing operational support to that group’103, to be deemed 
to have effective control. The lack of case- law regrettably still lends some 
obscurity as to what ‘effective control’ precisely means in signals 
intelligence operations. 
 
Even though the principles of Issa vouch, to some extent, for a controlled 
framework to disallow circumvention of a state’s obligations to ECHR, the 
judgement does not explicitly talk about the situation when an outside party 
(who is not a signatory state to the ECHR) breaches the signatory states’ 
obligations for them. This has happened which will be revealed in Chapter 
6. Nevertheless, judge Zupančič argues in a hearing on international 
surveillance in the European parliament, that the same principles should be 
applicable to a signatory state who requests a non- signatory state to spy on 
their own population.
104
 The reasoning behind such an application will be 
further explained in the analysis of this thesis.  
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6 Exchange agreements and 
power- abuse 
With the international and regional frameworks accounted for in the 
previous chapters, the thesis now narrows its focus further to bilateral 
relations and frameworks before an analysis can conclude the work in 
Chapter 7. This chapter assesses the specific intelligence exchanges between 
the US and the UK, Sweden and Germany. It does so to highlight the threats 
against the contracting parties’ democratic societies which stem from those 
very exchanges. Although most of the exchange framework is probably still 
undisclosed to the public, three of the major agreements (the UKUSA 
agreement, the US-Swedish Agreement on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology for Homeland Security Matters, and the Swedish Security 
Protection Agreement with the USA), in fact, are public.  
 
6.1 The UK and the US: the UKUSA- 
agreement 
The UKUSA agreement remains one of the most important documents 
regarding signals intelligence, as it solidified a partnership between the UK 
and the US which was dubbed the ‘special relationship’.105 This relationship 
had signals intelligence exchange and military cooperation at its core but 
stretched well into areas of trade and public policy-making. The agreement 
developed in 1946, as a means of protection against the USSR in the Cold 
War, but grew to include Canada, Australia and New Zeeland in 1948 and 
1956, respectively.
106
 Together, the partnership became known internally as 
‘the five eyes’107 and constituted the world’s largest surveillance network 
which contained ‘the Western World’s most closely guarded secrets’108. 
During this time, it was top- secret to the extent that the Prime Minister of 
Australia had no knowledge of the agreement until 1973.
109
 
 
The application of the agreement today is still under debate. As the 
agreement reads that ‘it will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its 
existence to any third party whatever’110 and the agreement was, in fact, 
fully undisclosed in 2010, it might be easy to say that the agreement’s 
relevance has come and gone. However, the agreement not only cemented a 
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Western partnership which meant the effective spying on each other’s 
populations for each other, but it was also the base for agreements between 
the US and a large number of ‘third party partner’- states, including 
Sweden, which are still of consequence today.
111
 Therefore, I still think the 
agreement is valuable to assess from an accountability perspective. 
 
The magnitude of the UKUSA agreement is unprecedented in the amount of 
data it concerns as point 3 in Appendix C states that: 
 
[…] each party will continue to make available to the other, 
continuously, currently, and without request all raw traffic, 
COMINT-end product and technical material acquired or produced, 
and all pertinent information concerning its activities, priorities and 
facilities, both present and planned […] 
 
As such, the agreement concerns a completely open relationship in all 
intelligence exchange, as was envisioned in the aide- memoires of the 
agreement.
112
 To be precise, the agreement regulates the collection of 
foreign traffic, acquisition of communications documents and equipment, 
traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, decryption and translation, and the acquisition 
of information regarding communications organizations, procedures, 
practices and equipment.
113
 The state of complete openness can only be 
compromised through specific exceptions, as paragraph 3b states that the 
parties must request specific information to not be shared with the other 
party, and suffer the other party’s approval of said request. Furthermore, 
paragraph 4b specifies that such exceptions must be motivated by 
requirements of ‘special interest’ to the state. Moreover, the parties vow to 
limit those exceptions ‘to the absolute minimum’.114 
 
Therefore, the agreement relies on other classified agreements of requests, 
to be exchanged between the parties alongside the UKUSA agreement. 
These have not been released. As such, it is still unclear what exceptions 
could be warranted by the special interest, as laid out in paragraph 4b. 
 
Large bulks of the agreement concern special measures for when one of the 
parties are at war. Conversely, a British overview of the data collected 
within the agreement reveals a complete focus on Soviet activity during the 
Cold War.
115
 This data is categorized into seven categories: military 
intelligence, political repression and censorship, life in the Soviet Union, 
Stalin, industry and agriculture, economy, and crime.
116
 It ranges from 
reports on major events in the country’s history, such as famine, natural 
disasters and flailing national economics, to interceptions of lesser affairs, 
such as private phone calls regarding Stalin’s 70th birthday celebrations. 
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Another report documents an intercept of a woman lamenting war- readiness 
in saying ‘I am afraid of leaving the kids here. What about a war all of a 
sudden?’117  
 
The severity of the confidentiality which marks the agreement can be 
illustrated by the 16
th
 point of Appendix B which solidifies that ‘No national 
of one party shall be permitted access to the other party’s COMINT 
agencies, or the products, or knowledge of the existence thereof, unless he 
be approved by his parent agency or Board and be properly 
indoctrinated’.118 Moreover, the agreement’s first article clearly binds the 
US Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board (and affiliated 
intelligence agencies) and the London SIGINT board (and affiliated 
intelligence agencies) as parties, not the US or the UK as states. This 
together with what has been presented above constitutes a state of secrecy 
not only with respect to the citizens of the respective countries, but also an 
internal secrecy toward other non-affiliated governmental organs. The ‘early 
papers’ concerning the UKUSA agreement confirm that the American 
president, as Commander in Chief, had full knowledge of the contract, but it 
is yet unknown to what extent the NSA or GCHQ had ‘approved’ and 
‘indoctrinated’ other non- army governmental bodies regarding such 
knowledge.
119
  
 
The agreement further regulates the relationship which the US and the UK 
should have with third parties. Point 5 of the agreement cements that any 
action with relevance to signals intelligence involving a third party should 
first be consulted with- and preferably approved by- the other. The first 
party should then make the result of such an action readily available for 
exchange.
120
 This means that every action and discussion regarding signals 
intelligence that, for example, Sweden had with the UK was passed on to 
the US and vice- versa during the application of the agreement. Moreover, 
point 8 under appendix P states that any agreement which the US or the UK 
may enter with a third party must be concealed from all other powers. 
Canada, Australia and New Zeeland are not labeled as third parties in the 
agreement, but rather ‘dominions’.121 This means that the prohibition to 
reveal the existence of the treaty to any third party did not apply to those 
states. However, as it has been confirmed that the Prime Minister of 
Australia had no knowledge of the agreement until 1973, it is safe to say 
that the UKUSA agreement was in no way exposed to any large numbers of 
governmental organs, even in the dominions. The difference between 
‘dominions’ and third party states also lies in that the UKUSA agreement 
insures the parties and the dominions that they are immune to each- other’s 
surveillance.
122
 As such, if there are any surveillance operations by the NSA 
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on British territory, targeting British citizens, Britain has knowingly allowed 
it. 
 
The current intelligence exchange between the UKUSA parties and 
dominions is partly enwrapped in mystery, as the UKUSA agreement has 
been made official and therefore null and void. However, in 2013, a Cabinet 
Office spokesman referred to the relationship between the NSA and the 
GCHQ as a ’60- year alliance’.123 Furthermore, the Snowden reports 
confirm a confidential relationship between the ‘Five Eyes’ that is as active 
as ever through a myriad of other treaties and programs known as PRISM, 
Muscular and Tempora.
124
 
125
 In an interview, Snowden stated that PRISM 
is a British server program which is much more far-reaching than the NSA’s 
programs: it allows 100% of data passed through the UK to be stored for 
three days for retrospective inspection. It is stored without any sensitivity 
with regards to content and is completely open for NSA to utilize. As 
Snowden said: 
 
If you download something and the [Content Delivery Network] 
happens to serve from the UK, we get it. If your sick daughter’s 
medical records get processed at a London call center… well, you get 
the idea.
126
 
 
It has also, for example, been revealed that the GCHQ has received £100 
million in exchange for information between 2010 and 2013 from the NSA, 
and that many ‘Five Eyes’- embassies and consulates around the world 
contain surveillance stations to intercept signals intelligence, as part of a 
network called ‘Stateroom’, which only a small portion of the working 
diplomats at the chanceries are aware about.
127
 
128
 A former Australian 
intelligence officer further stated that the intelligence is used, to some part, 
to counteract terrorism and trafficking, but that ‘the main focus is political, 
diplomatic and economic intelligence’.129 In the same vein, the GCHQ has a 
program called ‘Royal Concierge’ which targets ‘at least’ 350 upscale hotels 
across the world, in order to gain access to diplomats’ travel plans and, 
possibly, to wiretap the hotel room’s telephone as to gain access to sensitive 
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information.
130
 Moreover, the surveillance immunity between the UK, USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zeeland is still enforced.
131
 
 
6.1.1 Thatcher: ‘onside’ or out 
The clearest alleged instance of British power abuse in light of the ‘Five 
Eyes’- network is a Canadian account of an intelligence officer, Mike Frost, 
who claims to have intercepted private and professional communications of 
two Cabinet ministers in the Thatcher regime. The motive behind this 
surveillance was said to be that Margaret Thatcher perceived two ministers 
to not be ‘onside’ with certain unspecified policies, in 1983. Therefore, she 
requested the Canadian intelligence services through the UKUSA 
agreement’s frameworks, to collect information from the two ministers 
through electronic surveillance. Frost specifically states that this was done 
to circumvent legal hindrances preventing the British government from 
spying on their own population. The British parliament denies this to this 
day. According to Frost, the denial might not only be motivated by the 
British government wanting to cover their tracks, but by genuine ignorance. 
As he says: ‘they didn’t do anything. They know nothing about it. Of 
course, they didn’t do anything; we did it for them’. 132 133 
 
6.2 Sweden and the US: Agreement 
between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Government of the United States of 
America on Cooperation in Science 
and Technology for Homeland 
Security Matters (SÖ 2007:63) 
The current foundation for information exchange and technological 
cooperation between the US and Sweden is seemingly governed by the SÖ 
2007:63 agreement. The agreement’s objectives are laid out in article 2 to be 
promoting cooperative activity in: 
  
a) The prevention and detection of, response to, and forensics and 
attribution applied to, terrorist or other homeland security threat 
and/or indicators; 
b) The protection of critical infrastructure, and 
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c) Crisis response and consequence management and mitigation for 
high- consequence events 
 
The agreement is official in itself, but states that all disputes pertaining to 
the agreement, except disputes of intellectual property, shall be resolved 
‘only by consultation between the parties’134 and shall explicitly not be 
referred to any national court or international tribunal.
135
 Moreover, article 
14, paragraph 2e demands that classified information which is exchanged 
within the agreement must not be disclosed to any third party, unless there is 
mutual consent. 
 
However, the agreement also safeguards accountability and transparency to 
some extent, through solidifying that all information exchange between the 
parties should be handled in such a way that it corresponds to ‘applicable 
laws and regulations of the parties’136. Moreover, each party appoints one 
director to oversee the implementation and administration of the 
agreement.
137
 These two directors shall meet at least once a year to review 
the implementation of the agreement.
138
  
 
6.2.1 The Swedish Security Protection 
Agreement with the USA established in 
line with SÖ 2007: 63 (SÖ 2008:58) 
 
SÖ 2008:58 is a complement- agreement to SÖ 2007:63.
139
 As such, it 
reiterates some common points, such as ascertaining that disputes pertaining 
to the agreement shall be resolved between the parties and not referred to 
court or a tribunal.
140
  
 
However, SÖ 2008:58 goes deeper into circumstances where information 
may be divulged to the public. Article 6 states that when state agencies or 
deliverers of information wish to disclose confidential information, they 
have to do so in line with the Swedish constitution 
(Tryckfrihetsförordningen) and its Official Secrets Act. Conversely, this has 
to be done in line of the National Industrial Security Program Opening 
Manual, in America.
141
 Moreover, the same article states that Swedish 
establishments with a classified American contract in them can only divulge 
that information if they have been issued a written permit in advance. 
Similarly, such a permit must also be collected by an American 
establishment wishing to divulge information about a Swedish classified 
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contract. The official authority that shall grant this permit, and oversee the 
procedure, is the duly authorized agency for security protection (in this case 
Försvarets Matrielverk). This authorized agency was appointed for the task 
by the Swedish Government, as revealed by article 2 of the agreement. 
 
Thus, the agreements do not specify exactly which types of information 
exchange they have been created to enable, other than information which is 
important to homeland security, or how these are to be collected. The 
agreements do, however, underline the importance of governmental 
oversight and complete compliance with domestic law, and have a 
legitimate basis of conception in both the Swedish and the American 
governments.  
 
6.2.2 Sweden hacks computers and sells 
information on Russia to the US 
December 2013 saw the exposure of clandestine operations which FRA 
performed on behalf of the NSA.
142
 Sveriges Television revealed documents 
which originated in the Snowden- leaks which highlight Sweden’s role in 
providing ‘unique’143 information on Russian targets within internal politics, 
leadership and counterintelligence. Moreover, economic targets, such as oil 
and gas- companies were pursued as well, and not limited to Russia, but also 
involved the Baltic states.
144
 One source also claims that the military sector 
in the Baltic is an active target of the FRA who then transmits their findings 
to the NSA.
145
 According to leaked NSA documents, the FRA is viewed as a 
close and unique ally who deserves the gratitude of the NSA, because of 
their access to Russian targets.
146
 The cooperation between them has lead to 
NSA posting intelligence staff in Stockholm, for the official purpose of 
counter- terrorism efforts.
147
 
 
Furthermore, the FRA has been granted access to top secret networks within 
the NSA, such as the Quantum hacking program which sets out to actively 
hack and hi-jack computers.
148
 Leaked reports say that the FRA attempted 
to hack 100 computers on behalf of NSA, out of which the material from 
five hits was redirected to GCHQ’s servers.149 The reports do not say where 
exactly these computers were located.  
 
According to important Swedish media outlets, Sweden signed a top- secret 
agreement with the UKUSA parties and their dominions, in 1954, which 
solidified an intelligence exchange relationship of vital importance to the 
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Western powers during the Cold War. Such was the importance, that it 
raises questions of Swedish peace- time neutrality. This agreement was 
terminated in 2004 and replaced by the bilateral agreements which have 
been accounted for above.
150
 As such, intelligence on Russia, the Baltic 
states and said computer hackings are carried out and exchanged within the 
framework of SÖ 2007:63 and SÖ 2008:58. Additionally, it has been 
clarified by FRA officials, that the information which they provide NSA 
with does not come for free; they do not give away anything without 
information in return.
151
 
 
After the Snowden leaks, governmental leaders including the Swedish 
Minister of Defense were summoned to the parliament for a questioning on 
whether the freedom of Swedish citizens was at risk. The opposition stated 
that they were ‘convinced that Swedish citizens and Swedish institutions 
had been subject to surveillance’152. The Minister of Defense clarified that 
‘in the published material, there is nothing concerning any activity targeting 
Swedish interests’153 and that the exchange is being governed by oversight 
and clear legislation.
154
 
 
However, leader of the Centre Party Annie Lööf also stated in another 
source that she ‘assumes that the cooperation has been exercised within 
Swedish legal frameworks’, but that she is also ‘convinced, sadly, that both 
my telephone and my email are being controlled by a foreign power’.155 
 
6.3 Germany and the US: hidden 
teamwork and talks of a non-spying 
pact  
 
At present, Germany has no official exchange agreement with the USA. 
This is substantiated by Chancellor Angela Merkel claiming that she and her 
government were ‘completely unaware’ of NSA activities on German 
territory by the time of the Snowden- leaks.
156
 Furthermore, since these 
revelations, Germany has been pushing the agenda for a non- spying treaty 
with the US, which America has declined to engage in.
157
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In light of this background, it should be stated that West- Germany did have 
a secret cooperation agreement with the NSA already in 1963, as a 
supplementary act to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) status 
of forces agreement.
158
 This seized to exist, however, in 1968 when the 
Western Allies officially returned surveillance responsibilities back to 
Germany.
159
 Along with this, a privileged supplementary agreement 
solidifies NSA’s right to continue its own surveillance measures in the area 
to ‘protect their forces’.160 
 
If one fast forwards the clock to 2013, the Snowden reports indeed reveal a 
very close relationship between the BND and NSA. In fact, the BND is 
being granted access to state- of- the- art technology known as the 
XKeyscore network, shares surveillance bases with the Americans, and 
provides them with masses of intercepted data.
161
 Der Spiegel has, among 
other things, reported that during one single day (January 7, 2013), the NSA 
tapped into 60 million phone calls inside Germany.
162
 Moreover, it has been 
stated that data on German citizens were passed on to the NSA on two 
occasions, but no information regarding the nature of their surveillance, or 
the warrant has been released, other than the assurance that it was ‘in full 
compliance with the country’s data privacy laws’.163 
 
The cooperation has become close to the extent that the NSA has described 
the BND as its ‘most prolific partner’164, and praised the BND for trying to 
influence the German government to mitigate domestic privacy protection 
as to yield more legal marginal for the security agencies to perform signals 
acquisition and exchange.
165
 
 
So, granted this close cooperation between the BND and the NSA, are the 
German push for a non- spying agreement and Angela Merkel’s self-alleged 
unawareness of cooperation just a façade? How can the two agencies 
operate in partnership without agreements which set the terms? German 
newspaper Der Spiegel asks the very same question, but rhetorically states:  
 
Does that really matter? What is worse? To be governed by a cabinet 
that conceals its connivance from citizens? Or to have a Chancellor 
and ministers whose intelligence agencies exist in a parallel world, 
beyond the supervision of the government and parliament? 
166
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According to an interview with Snowden, bilateral intelligence exchange 
methods are thoughtfully carried out in a way which never requires the 
agencies to account for how they know something. He states that this is a 
conscious necessity to ‘insulate […] political leaders from the backlash of 
knowing how grievously they’re violating global privacy’.167 
 
6.3.1 The Merkel incident 
In October 2013, the Guardian reported 35 world leaders to be monitored in 
different ways by the NSA. One of these leaders was German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel who had her professional and personal telephone bugged 
since 2002; thus already during President George W. Bush’s regime.168 The 
number itself allegedly came from a US government department official. 
The active surveillance of the Chancellor’s phones had been carried out via 
a surveillance station in the American embassy in Berlin.
169
 When German 
officials requested access to the top floor of the embassy, they were 
refused.
170
 Shortly after, it was revealed that the British embassy also 
operated a listening post of their own.
171
 Upon learning about the invasion 
of privacy, Merkel, the German government and a number of other 
European states expressed disappointment and anger toward the US 
government which brought about tension in EU- US relations, considering a 
‘nest of spies’ in Berlin embassies a violation of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations.
172
 The effects of the incident have been serious to the 
extent that Merkel’s party openly questioned the Trans- Atlantic free Trade 
Agreement for the first time, in light of the surveillance scandal.
173
 Merkel 
personally called Obama to obtain clarification on the matter, who 
apologized, but said he had no knowledge about the operation.
174
 Merkel 
further commented that ‘spying between friends, that’s just not done’175 and 
likened the NSA’s actions to those of the Stasi.176 She also expressed worry 
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and mistrust toward the US government’s handling of the issue, not only 
because of the nature of the surveillance operations, but also because of the 
potential damage which might come to all agencies in cooperation with the 
NSA from allowing Snowden access to such classified files, and ultimately 
leak them.
177
 
 
After the incident, Germany went on an operational offensive, calling on the 
EU to create a network powerful enough to curb British and American 
surveillance. One of the points of the proposition was to create European 
server networks so that emails and social correspondence did not have to 
travel through American servers, which would ultimately subject them to 
American and/ or British espionage.
178
 Moreover, Germany and Brazil 
began work on collectively drafting an electronic privacy resolution in the 
UN to further strengthen international legal frameworks in the field.
179
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7 Analysis 
For clarity and efficiency, the analysis is structured in the same sequential 
order as the body of the essay; namely, accountability issues within Rule of 
Law are discussed followed by examinations of the international and 
regional legal frameworks in light of the assessed intelligence exchanges 
and violations. Lastly, the two points of questions in the introduction are 
answered followed by a conclusion of the work. But before this structural 
sequence of analysis can commence, the thesis must first highlight issues of 
evaluative certainty from the material. 
 
7.1 The need of complementary 
information 
It is true that the Snowden leaks were unprecedented in the amounts of top 
secret NSA documents which saw the light of day. The importance of that 
information cannot be overestimated as it put questions of privacy law and 
legal transparency on the agenda of national parliaments and international 
organizations around the globe. However, to fully understand the 
consequences of- and exercise pertinent accountability onto- those actions 
and trespasses, some gaps have to be filled in. The Snowden leaks meant 
that state agencies had unquestionably acted outside the parameters of legal 
frameworks on a multitude of levels in collecting data, but the assessment of 
the full extent of those trespasses relies on knowing how the surveillance 
agencies and governments used that data. This is information which is still 
to be disclosed or discovered in some cases.  
 
One example of this is the setting up of surveillance stations inside 
embassies, which clearly violates the official purposes of a diplomatic 
mission as laid out in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
article 3. However, a state’s claim of a convention breach in the ICJ could 
be further substantiated if one could show a trespass of the principle of non- 
intervention. The principle of non- intervention holds that certain matters, 
such as politics and domestic economic policy is within the sole prerogative 
of the national state. This comes with a corresponding obligation for foreign 
states to respect a domestic state’s sovereignty over these issues. Thus, 
when a foreign state taps into information regarding politics and economics, 
and uses it, it could well be within the description of a breach of respect for 
state sovereignty. But this will be very difficult, if not impossible, to prove 
without knowledge and evidence that the information has been used in a 
coercive manner to actively sway the domestic situation. For in order to 
constitute an ‘intervention’, the situation has to entail more than mere 
intelligence acquisition; the intelligence also has to be used in an illicit way 
to fulfill the requisite. 
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Of course, it seems believable that the information at hand was, in fact, used 
to affect internal markets and/ or gain advantages to the American market 
through industrial espionage. Why else would the Swedish information 
exchange on Russia conveniently combine supervision of local politics and 
the energy sector? To counteract terrorism? The news of the surveillance 
scandals further affected Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party to question the 
Transatlantic Free Trade agreement, which should also give an indication 
that the access to information has plausibly been used, on the US’ side, to 
negatively affect the EU market. But is the situation severe to the extent of 
constituting an unlawful interference, which the ICJ defines as an act with 
coercion at its heart? In my opinion, the material which has been put 
forward does not present sufficient information to make an informed 
assessment on the matter, as it does not specify how the acquired 
intelligence has been used by the different states. 
 
Another situation which could be elucidated by more information is the 
disclosure that the BND has yielded information on German citizens to the 
NSA. This could, possibly, be a breach at the very heart of ECHR art. 8, but 
such a case would have to be bolstered by more information regarding the 
nature of the intercepted communication and what alleged crimes warranted 
it. Due to operational secrecy which is still enforced, citizens have to, at 
present day, simply take their word for it when the BND and NSA say that 
the operation indeed was ‘in full compliance with the country’s data privacy 
laws’. Similarly, the FRA hacked 100 computers for the sake of NSA. 
Depending on where these computers were situated, another clear article 8- 
violation might have happened. Given the NSA’s extensive cooperation 
networks with a multitude of European partners, one might wonder why 
specifically the FRA was tasked with this job if the computers were outside 
Swedish territory. However, speculation does not make a court case. 
 
Therefore, one is left with a situation of appearance and reality: the 
appearance of serious breaches of law, but the reality of yet missing pieces 
of the puzzle to hold the US and its partners fully accountable for its 
actions; the absolute appearance of a secret exchange treaty between 
Germany and the USA and evidence of close cooperation, but the reality of 
no undisclosed document showing the explicit terms of exchange to prove 
it. 
 
Furthermore, this thesis had to use second hand sources to access the 
Snowden- reports. This is due to that Snowden used newspapers The 
Guardian, The Washington post and Der Spiegel as channels for his 
account. In terms of source- evaluation, it would be better if the reports 
could be accessed from the first source, meaning the original files from 
NSA and its partners, but this is impossible as Snowden exclusively chose 
said newspapers as a platform through which his findings were published. 
 
Lastly, debate has erupted regarding the veracity of political leaders’ claims 
that they had no knowledge of clandestine surveillance operations. Der 
Spiegel rhetorically asked what difference it makes, as believing in their 
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ignorance means that political leaders are detached from one wing of 
governmental operations, while not believing them means that they are 
trying to conceal their own accountability within the field. From a strictly 
moral perspective, it might be difficult to judge which is worst. But from a 
legal perspective, the difference is substantial, as will be further explained in 
the subsequent part of the analysis. 
 
7.2 Rule of Law issues 
 As has been presented above, the concept of Rule of Law is constantly 
subject to interpretation. There have been so many schools regarding the 
concept that critics argue that it has lost effective meaning. Nevertheless, 
however varied perceptions of Rule of Law might be, scholars seem to be 
less divided on the meaning of its antithesis: Rule of Man, a legal regime in 
which select individuals can be placed above the law and not be subject to 
legal accountability. As the opposite of the concept seems to have lack of 
accountability at its core, Rule of Law should, é contrario, be said to have a 
high level of accountability at its core, with the same certainty that Rule of 
Man does not. 
 
Chapter 3 explained the intrinsic relationship accountability has to two other 
criteria of Rule of Law: political participation and legal certainty. How these 
three interact, and what it means for the exercise of accountability remains a 
question of interpretation, though. A ‘thin’, or formalist, view on Rule of 
Law relies on the correct implementation of legal positivism, while 
Peczenik’s model requires the attainment of ethical practices and values as 
well. 
 
The most blatant problem in terms of Rule of Law with regards to the 
assessed exchange treaties is their secrecy. The UKUSA agreement affected, 
and continues to affect through its aftermath, billions of citizens worldwide 
who did not have knowledge of what consequences their actions might have 
had in light of that agreement, until recently. What is more is that German 
citizens and leaders are having their data processed by Americans without 
proper means of exercising accountability because leaders of government, 
truthfully or untruthfully, deny knowing about it. This leads us into the 
question posed by Der Spiegel under the previous heading: what difference 
does it make whether political leaders are genuinely unaware of surveillance 
operations, or just pretend to be ignorant? The difference obviously lies in 
that the first instance suggests that governments and leaders have lost 
control over state authorities while the second scenario suggests a 
condoning of illicit operations and covertly placing heads- of- state above 
the legal regime by avoiding accountability, not unlike a Rule of Man- 
scenario.  
 
 If one takes the American bugging of Angela Merkel as an example, one 
can see how the difference can, if one exaggerates the situation, affect state 
responsibility. Assume that the American government is frail to the extent 
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that it has very little control over state authorities who virtually act as free 
agents. Then, the actions of these agents will actualize ARSIWA Art. 8 
which demands that a state has to fulfill requirements of effective control 
over groups in order to be held accountable for their acts; whereas a stabile 
government with proper supervision will automatically be judged in the 
light of ARSIWA art 42 which assumes state responsibility without the 
qualifications of effective control. Thus, if the NSA bugged Merkel 
completely on its own whim in an uncontrolled government, it would be 
harder for the outside world to hold the US government accountable to that 
action. On the other hand, if President Obama did know about the Merkel 
incident but lied about it, he condoned an American breach of international 
law in the form of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which is 
particularly interesting in light of his 2008 campaign words that 
‘international law is not an empty promise’. By denying accountability, he 
also undermines a core principle of Rule of Law in society, which in hand 
undermines the democratic foundations on which the American, British, 
Swedish and German societies rely. 
 
The importance of transparency in Rule of Law and accountability is 
obvious since even the formalist view on Rule of Law underscores its 
significance. Fuller’s list cements that there cannot be Rule of Law without 
public rules and an accord between the rules which have been publicized 
and the ones that are implemented in practice. As many exchange treaties 
(such as the Swedish ones, for example) are integrated into national 
legislation, I think it is fair to equate the assessed treaties to what Fuller 
describes as ‘rules’. Peczenik agrees with that prerequisite and highlights 
the difficulty in exercising accountability on a reasonable basis if actions by 
the government happen in the dark. Without transparency and public 
doctrine, how will voters exercise informal responsibility and not renew the 
contract of power for politicians who might clandestinely conduct policies 
against the constituency’s wishes? And how can there be any formal 
responsibility through contractual obligations, without the knowledge of a 
contract?  
 
Indeed, Rule of Law and consequently democracy rely on unveiled 
governance. On that note, one might underline the irony that the German 
BND operates on a domestic mandate to prevent crimes against democracy, 
while, in fact, the doctrine of Rule of Law cements that the agency is 
undermining that very concept- democracy- through extensive hidden 
cooperation with the NSA. Moreover, the question of how there can be any 
certainty of what consequences an individual’s actions might have if rules 
governing these actions are covert goes to the very heart of the principle of 
legality. This, in turn, raises follow- up questions: if society accepts that 
citizens shall not be fully able to predict the consequences of their actions in 
surveillance operations, where does society draw the line? What other areas 
of public policy- making and exercise of power should warrant the 
infringement of citizens’ foresight of legal consequences? 
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To me, these questions open dangerous doors. In a strict theoretical sense of 
Rule of Law, I cannot accept the compromise which comes with hidden 
legislation in society, no matter its purpose. However, if one takes 
practicality into account and looks at the doctrine on the subject which holds 
that no state on earth represents the state of perfect Rule of Law, it becomes 
clear how states find it reasonable to compromise the concept. Moreover, 
one might ask oneself: does the complete fulfillment of Rule of Law 
inevitably mean a perfect society? In reality, is a full democracy always 
desirable or even possible to achieve? States around the world have taken 
conscious measures to proportionally limit the exercise of full democracy so 
as to ensure societal and governmental efficiency. One example of this is 
Sweden’s requirement that a party needs at least 4% of the constituency’s 
votes in order to enter parliament. One state which did not employ a similar 
compromise was the Weimar Republic, which allowed for full proportional 
representation.
180
 Yet, Sweden is viewed as a stabile state with a high degree 
of democracy, while the Weimar Republic ended in absolute autocracy. The 
full analysis of why this came to be is outside the scope of this thesis; 
however, the example can be used to suggest that the doctrine on Rule of 
Law is perhaps not fully compatible with the modern concept of state.  
 
Out of the assessed treaties, only SÖ 2007:63 and SÖ 2008:58 have been 
fully undisclosed to the public since their inception. They are also cemented 
in governmental oversight and bind the state of Sweden and the state of 
USA, as opposed to agreements made under the UKUSA treaty in which 
security agencies entered agreements with other security agencies, outside 
the knowledge of some of the highest political leaders of countries affected 
by it. This vouches for a higher fulfillment of Rule of Law on Sweden’s 
part. However, one must also look at the moral aspects of the purpose of the 
agreements, according to Peczenik’s model, and see if the implementation 
of the agreement corresponds to its purpose, according to Fuller’s eighth 
point.  
 
The first moral qualitative aspect which can be assessed in light of the 
Swedish- American exchange is that Sweden, bound by domestic and 
regional legislation which prohibits the state from performing strictly 
domestic surveillance, is cooperating with an agency which has admitted to 
not share the same level of protection for its own citizens. The NSA is, by 
domestic law, authorized to process strictly domestic correspondence 
through ‘incidental collection’. While this might constitute a difference in 
moral quality of the legislation, I believe that it would be disproportionate to 
discredit the agreement because of this point, as it would mean that 
international agreements would only hold validity in light of Rule of Law, if 
their signatory parties would share the exact same quality of domestic 
legislation. As that would be realistically impossible, I believe that 
somewhat differing moral qualities of legislation should fall within the 
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margin of appreciation of Rule of Law, as it has been shown that Rule of 
Law can be fulfilled to different degrees. 
 
The Swedish- American agreements have the official purpose of 
counteracting terrorism, protecting infrastructure and homeland security. 
These objectives might well be deemed sufficiently qualitative from a moral 
standpoint; but have they been fulfilled? The targeting of military agendas 
in Russia seems to have clear relevance to the objectives, but the relevance 
of the private energy sector and internal policies (which were, indeed, 
specifically referenced to as internal) are less obvious. At a glance, it would 
seem that data regarding those operations has more to do with industrial 
espionage than counter terrorism efforts. However, as FRA stated that they 
never give away information without expecting something in return, one 
does not know if the objective is indirectly fulfilled by the US providing 
Sweden with other information of more relevance to Swedish national 
security, thanks to Sweden’s Russian intelligence. Similarly it is reasonable 
to argue that the UKUSA agreement is insufficient in its accord between 
purpose and effective employment, as the treaty’s objective was seemingly 
to establish a completely open relationship between the US and the UK, but 
was mainly used to tap into Soviet intelligence. 
 
7.3 The international framework 
From the presented material, it has become clear that the diplomatic world 
plays an important role in conducting illicit surveillance operations. Both of 
the embassies of the USA and the UK were involved in the bugging of 
Angela Merkel through listening posts and surveillance stations in their 
respective Berlin embassies. Moreover, leaks from the ‘Stateroom’ network 
shows that Australian, Canadian and New Zeeland embassies have been 
used in a similar fashion. Firstly, such behavior violates the Vienna 
Convention of Diplomatic Relations as article 27 of said convention 
requires the sending country of the diplomatic mission to acquire the 
receiving state’s consent before installing and using a wireless transmitter. 
Secondly, it violates the convention in non- conforming to the official 
purposes of the mission, as laid out in Article 3. 
 
Another convention which might be of consequence in the field is the 
ICCPR whose 17
th
 article stipulates protection for citizens against arbitrary 
or unlawful interference in their correspondence. The ICCPR is, as has been 
shown, binding to states in relation to their own populations. This presents 
an issue which is central to the topic of this thesis: civil rights can only be 
breached by those obligated to respect them; meaning that there is generally 
no legal basis to condemn, for example, American spying on British soil 
since America cannot be bound by British law and civil rights. There are, of 
course, exceptions such as the principle of non- intervention, the doctrine of 
effective control and breaches of conventions, but these wrongful acts are 
governed by international public law and EU law, not civil rights. In order 
to claim accountability in light of ICCPR, one has to highlight a breach 
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committed by the domestic state. Such a breach could be that an intelligence 
exchange agreement is not performed according to its purpose, especially if 
it is incorporated into domestic law, as it will be deemed unlawfully 
exercised by the state. There are grounds suggesting that the Swedish 
exchange agreements are employed contrary to their purposes; however, the 
question remains somewhat unclear as it has not been revealed if the 
information Sweden received back from America after its hacking of 
computers and infiltration of Russian energy and political targets indeed had 
a value in countering terrorism. If one could show that, for example, the 
Swedish exchange agreements are unlawfully exercised in that they affect 
Swedish citizens by not functioning according to their purpose, then all 
signatory states to the ICCPR can hold Sweden accountable to that breach 
through the doctrine of erga omnes partes- obligations. 
 
Furthermore, a number of instances above motivate a debate on whether or 
not the principle of non- intervention has been violated. These instances 
include the bugging of Angela Merkel, the Swedish information sale on 
Russia to America, and the ‘Royal Concierge’- network which bugs 
diplomats’ hotel- rooms. However, an intervention requires more unlawful 
activity than simply gaining access to information; the information also has 
to be used in a coercive manner. As Oppenheim’s International Law states, 
‘interference pure and simple is not intervention’. In this regard, I judge that 
not enough material has been released to substantiate such a claim, but the 
area would naturally benefit from more information and elucidating case- 
law concerning the principle of non- intervention in relation to surveillance. 
 
Within the realm of international law, I believe that states have the best 
possibility to exercise accountability onto parties in breach of their 
obligations through the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. It is 
clear that the ‘Five Eyes’ powers are abusing the purpose of their diplomatic 
missions in their SIGINT acquisition, and grounds for jurisdiction in the ICJ 
have already been cemented in the countries’ ratification of the Optional 
Protocol. 
 
7.4 The Regional Framework 
Weber and Saravia vs. Germany, and Liberty and others vs. the UK 
cemented that the very existence of legislation which enables surveillance 
constitutes an infringement of article 8 ECHR in relation to everyone whom 
this legislation could be applied to. In order to not be found guilty of a 
human rights violation, states have to show that their measures are needed in 
a democratic society, and in accordance with national law. Here, it is easy to 
see the direct application of Rule of Law principles in the work of the 
ECtHR. Special emphasis was put on that legislation had to be accessible to 
the public, and that it should be specified as to provide citizens with the 
knowledge of what reasonable consequences their actions might have. 
Germany was found not guilty because of specified and open legislation, 
whereas the UK was found guilty for undisclosed methods of the agency’s 
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oversight and analysis of material, as well as too general legislation. This is 
important in relation to intelligence exchange agreements for two reasons: 
 
1)  If one can equate treaties to that of legislation, which I believe is 
rational, especially when they are integrated into domestic law, then 
the two assessed cases suggest that clandestine surveillance 
agreements are, by nature, illegal since citizens have no possibilities 
of foreseeing their consequence for them. 
 
2) Exchange agreements have to be exercised properly according to 
their purpose, as to safeguard citizens’ possibilities of foreseeing the 
legislation’s/ treaty’s consequences, and avoid illegality. For if there 
is no accord between what the legislation sets out to do and what it 
actually does, the legislation becomes meaningless, undemocratic 
and impossible to follow. 
 
As for number two, the Swedish exchange agreements might be deemed 
insufficient as the selling of information on Russian internal politics and 
private energy interests has a less than obvious connection to 
counterterrorism and homeland security.  
 
In the material of the body of the thesis, Snowden revealed a system which 
stores 100 % of data which passes through the UK’s technological 
infrastructure without content sensitivity, for three days. He describes this as 
something even more far- reaching than the activities of the NSA. If this 
holds true, then citizens’ data is inevitably being collected and shared 
without any specific suspicion of crime, terrorism or relevance to security 
whatever. This can impossibly be condoned by the second paragraph of 
ECHR art 8, and unmistakably constitutes a breach of the convention, as it 
is not only done covertly, but also lacks the democratic value of qualitative 
legislation and governance. If the GCHQ operates this system without any 
supervision, the domestic legislation is still too liberal in the mandate given 
to GCHQ, even after Liberty. On the other hand, if the operation is 
condoned by higher authority, the UK has knowingly infringed upon the 
right to privacy in the dark, as citizens’ data was collected with no 
legitimate warrant according to ECHR art. 8 (2). 
 
The most interesting and relevant part of EU- law in relation to surveillance 
cooperation and exchange between states, is to what extent a state can be 
held accountable for another state’s operations, as long as the first state has 
exercised effective control. In more concrete words, can a state avoid 
accountability in light of the ECHR by asking another state to spy on its 
own population? This is the exact scenario of Margaret Thatcher’s alleged 
espionage on two of her ministers, performed by a Canadian intelligence 
force via the UKUSA agreement, as described in Chapter 6. The question 
demands the analysis of Issa and others vs. Turkey (henceforth Issa) along 
with the Tadić- case, ECHR article 1, and ARSIWA article 8.  
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The foundation of the legal issue is how to understand the phrase ‘within 
their jurisdiction’ in ECHR art. 1. Issa stated that opinio juris in public 
international law holds that jurisdiction is, as a rule, territorial but may 
sometimes be extra- territorial. One condition where it may be extra- 
territorial is when a state exercises effective control of an area outside its 
national territory as a consequence of military action. The military action 
may be lawful or unlawful. This means that a state can be held accountable 
for breaches of rights of people outside the state’s territory, but within its 
control. As prerequisites of ‘effective control’, the court said that the control 
does not have to be detailed, but suffices to reach an ‘overall level’. The 
adoption of this doctrine by the ECtHR stems from a wish to prevent ECHR 
article 1 to be read as allowing breaches of the ECHR outside of the 
signatory parties’ territory, which would be prohibited within that territory. 
 
The Tadić case of the ICTY has further elucidated the term ‘effective 
control’, to some extent by saying that if a state has a role in organizing, 
coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in 
addition to financing, training and equipping or providing operational 
support to that group, the state can be said to have effective control. 
 
Since the ECtHR looked at international public law when formulating its 
verdict in the Issa- case, I think it is relevant to look closer at the 
international norm which stipulates the possibility of exercising 
accountability through effective control: ARSIWA article 8. According to 
this, actions of persons or groups can be accredited to a state if they are 
operating under instructions of, or the control of that state. 
 
ECtHR- judge Zupančič maintains that an interpretation of these cases and 
norms can lead to ECtHR holding a state accountable for circumventing 
civil rights obligations by asking a partnering state to do its deed through 
intelligence exchange agreements. However, such a case- law precedent is 
not developed yet, and I believe that there is value in underlining similarities 
and differences between the established case-law in Issa and Tadić, and the 
situation at hand. 
 
Firstly, both Tadić and Issa speak specifically about military operations. 
There are many common features between signals intelligence operations 
and military operations, but are they synonymous? One feature that they 
share is the purpose of protecting homeland security against foreign powers. 
Moreover, intelligence agencies are often explicitly subdivisions of the 
army, such as FRA, and therefore under their control and responsibility. A 
difference between them lies in that, with today’s technological 
infrastructure, surveillance operations can more or less take place from any 
geographical point of the world, whereas military operations (as one usually 
talks about them) are normally bound to territory.  
 
Secondly, can the same requirements for effective control be placed on 
surveillance operations as military operations? Can one organize, 
coordinate, plan, train, equip and finance surveillance activities similarly to 
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military operations? As I see it, yes. Surveillance operations might not 
require the same equipment or manpower as a platoon, but ARSIWA article 
8 is applicable just the same, as it can deem even a single person 
accountable for his or her actions. 
 
Thirdly, Issa talked specifically about conditions where a state’s jurisdiction 
might extend beyond its territory, whereas the Thatcher- incident revolves 
around a state asking another state to spy on its population for it. Thus the 
question would not regard extension of territorial jurisdiction, but rather 
over the actions of another state’s authorities. However, this rule was 
formulated with the intention of preventing a state to breach human rights 
extra- territorially, which they would be legally prevented from on its own 
territory. If one applies a teleological point of view, then there is no reason 
why the Issa precedent should not include the case of a state facing 
accountability for what foreign agents have done on its own territory, 
because it would further protect the interest of the ECHR. In fact, it should 
rather be a clearer case of accountability as a state should have better 
conditions to oversee actions on its own territory than abroad.  
 
Thus, I agree with judge Zupančič in that the above assessed framework 
should be applicable to states circumventing their legal obligations through 
intelligence exchange agreements, as it would lie within a teleological 
interpretation of Issa, and military operations and surveillance operations 
are similar in that they share purpose and can be tested in the same 
framework for ‘effective control’. The fact that the doctrine of ‘effective 
control’ stems from ARSIWA which is originally a norm of public 
international law does not limit its relevance to EU- law as the ECtHR 
consciously adopted its significance in Issa.  
 
However, it should be reiterated that before this theory can be put to the test, 
a case would have to exhaust all local remedies before the ECtHR could 
have the possibility of extending its case- law on the subject. 
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
At the outset of this thesis, the goal of investigating the need for regional 
frameworks in signals intelligence exchange from an accountability 
perspective was said to be pursued through the following questions: 
 
 To what extent do the current legal frameworks regarding 
information exchange between the US and her European allies 
enable states to circumvent international, regional and civil legal 
obligations? 
 How would regional frameworks help in enforcing accountability 
onto states in breach of their international and civil rights 
obligations?  
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The work has now assessed enough material to give a comprehensive 
answer to these questions.  
 
As has been shown, there are a number of international norms regulating 
aspects of international surveillance, including conventions and customary 
law. Outside of this realm, regional EU law provides a solid ground of 
obligation for its member states in relation to civil rights. Together, these 
form a concrete framework for limiting the possibility of power abuse by 
the member states. EU case- law provide tough requirements for the 
domestic legislation regarding surveillance to fulfil. In fact, it is so tough 
that it can be read to ban all undisclosed pact- making, and require the 
agreements to be properly exercised according to their purpose, if the 
exchange agreements can be interpreted as legislation, which it definitely 
can in the cases where international agreements are incorporated into 
domestic law. Moreover, if a situation occurs where a state tries to 
circumvent their obligations by contracting a second state to perform the 
‘breach’ for them, there is good reason to believe that the ECtHR has legal 
grounds to strike down the first state through the doctrine of effective 
control. 
 
Even though this thesis does not revolve around procedural law, it should be 
noted, however, that there are some hindrances to exercising full 
accountability in light of the above mentioned. The most obvious one is that 
the case- law in which a state could be found accountable for a foreign 
state’s actions on its territory is not fully developed or tested yet. Moreover, 
before the doctrine could be tested in the ECtHR, such a case would have to 
travel through all instances of domestic courts. This will take years to 
materialize, and can prove to be a costly process.  
 
Furthermore, exercising accountability in the arena of international public 
law is bound to the specific grounds of jurisdiction for the ICJ. If a party 
cannot show an existing contract between itself and another state yielding 
jurisdiction to the ICJ for that specific matter, the court cannot solve the 
dispute.  
 
As such, states with motives to breach their civil rights obligations have had 
the opportunity to profit from procedural hindrances to avoid accountability. 
Examples of such power- abuses are the alleged spying operation which 
Thatcher is said to have outsourced to Canada; possibly breaching the 
principle of non- intervention when Angela Merkel found herself bugged by 
the USA (and the UK), and the Stateroom- network’s bugging of diplomat’s 
hotel rooms around the world. It should be reiterated, though, that the 
veracity of the Thatcher allegations has not been fully established yet, and 
that more information is needed on the Stateroom- network and how the UK 
and the US used the information they garnered from Merkel’s bugging, to 
build a case.  
 
However, some examples of power- abuse in the field have been nothing 
short of illegal, regardless of procedural circumvention of accountability. 
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The UK and the US (and their partners) have breached the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations in setting up surveillance stations in 
embassies around the world; one example of specific value is the bugging of 
Angela Merkel. Moreover, if the PRISM- network operates in the fashion 
which Snowden describes, then it is in clear breach of ECHR Art. 8, as the 
surveillance operations are carried out regardless of content, thus without 
any of the legitimate reasons listed in Art. 8 (2), and in a clandestine 
manner. Furthermore, there is reason to examine whether the intelligence 
exchange agreements actually carry out their purpose, which is questionable 
in the Swedish- American treaties and in the UKUSA agreement. If one 
applies the principles in Weber and Saravia vs. Germany to exchange 
agreements, undisclosed agreements can also, per definition, be viewed as 
illicit. In all of this, undisclosed procedures and cooperation have led to very 
little transparency in the field, and practical impossibility for citizens to 
foresee the consequences of their actions, or to hold their leaders 
accountable. 
 
Since surveillance matters are undergone in the name of national security, 
and the current EU- treaty places all responsibility for national security in 
the hands of the member states, a shift in responsibility from the member 
state to the EU would mean a fundamental remake of the structure of the 
EU, and lessen the principle of sovereignty. However, the EU could form a 
stronger framework for how bilateral treaties are implemented in national 
law and carried out in practise. One example could be to have a central 
organization in the EU, which would actively supervise all domestic 
security agencies, how they implement their legislation and minimize the 
risk of power abuse.  
 
One reason why I believe regional frameworks would be in order is that the 
assessed material seems to suggest that modern surveillance operations are 
often, by nature, international. The EU has delegated the mandate to acquire 
SIGINT to the member states, but it has become clear that states depend on 
international networks and exchange agreements to fulfil the purpose of the 
security agencies to protect homeland security. Out of the assessed 
countries, no security agency operates completely on its own, but shares 
networks and facilities with foreign agencies to create synergy in the field. 
As such, it seems rational that regional or international rules should govern 
a regional or international relationship, to create a uniform framework of 
legal certainty, which would enhance the Rule of Law for all of the Union. 
 
Moreover, said reliance on cooperation in the current framework can also 
prove a growing ground for civil rights circumvention and power abuse. Out 
of the assessed material, several possible breaches of international law can 
be listed. States have an interest to profit from information on foreign 
economic and political policy, and doing this in an illicit, but covert, manner 
has been facilitated by surveillance operations which are carried out in the 
name of national security. The legal article which seems to hinder the 
security agencies the most from all- encompassing SIGINT acquisition is 
ECHR art 8, whose second paragraph requires the direct implementation of 
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Rule of Law- principles in domestic legislation. As such, a regional 
framework providing supervision in SIGINT matters would go hand in hand 
with other areas of vital interest to the EU, such as safeguarding human 
rights, which already has a uniform regional framework.  
 
One argument against a stronger regional framework in the field might be 
that if power abuse can happen in the member states, why should it not in 
the EU? However, I believe that a regional framework (such as a 
supervisory organ) would have less political incentive to cloak transparency 
in the member states, as it would have no direct interest in how a revealed 
power abuse would affect the support for the government. Moreover, a 
regional framework would have a less direct economic gain from permitting 
security agencies to, for example, tap into foreign diplomatic and economic 
correspondence.  
 
Furthermore, a motivation of change must inevitably be contrasted by the 
sustainability of the present situation. As has been accounted for in the body 
of this thesis, aspects of the current intelligence exchange are in clear breach 
of international conventions and are clouded by no insight whatsoever by 
the general public. When citizens and leaders alike have asked for an 
explanation to the events, the yielded answers have been far from 
satisfactory in a democratic society, avoiding accountability and 
responsibility. In my opinion, the citizens of the EU deserve a structure 
steeped in a higher level of legal certainty. The current situation also entails 
the ECtHR as the supreme guardian of the ECHR. However, before it can 
exercise its powers in the court- room, a case would have to exhaust all local 
remedies, which is a lengthy and costly process. If one would establish a 
central supervisory organ, which would routinely oversee SIGINT- matters, 
a sound measure of Rule of Law and respect for human rights could be 
proactively implemented, without the procedural hindrances of a tribunal. 
 
Another argument for a firmer stance on accountability in the area is that not 
enforcing accountability onto the current breaches by the assessed states 
may have severe global consequences in the future. The discourse presented 
in this thesis has the US, the UK, Sweden and Germany as its vantage point, 
because their societies rest on a democratic rule which is fundamentally 
threatened when governments evade accountability for their actions. 
However, it should be noted that issues of Rule of Law in SIGINT 
operations are a global problem. A plethora of states have active 
surveillance programs, but only a few have the technology and capacity of 
the assessed states. This might change before long, though. As such, idly 
condoning the undermining of Rule of Law in the assessed states might set a 
devastating example for emerging global powers in the future.   
 
To conclude, the Snowden reports of 2013 shook the world with an 
unprecedented insight into the intelligence acquisition industry, which 
utilizes partnership agreements to achieve its goal of protecting homeland 
security, but also illicit methods to advance the respective state’s economic, 
political and military agenda. In the assessed legislation and agreements, 
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security agencies have operated on undisclosed mandates for cooperation 
which have resulted in the breach of international law (particularly the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations in the case of Angela Merkel), 
the ECHR article 8, and arguably the principle of non- intervention, 
although this debate needs more evidentiary substance to enable a 
comprehensive assessment. The lack of transparency in the field also raises 
questions whether existing public exchange agreements actually fulfil their 
purposes. Undisclosed agreements, power abuse, and legislation and 
agreements which may or may not fulfil what they set out to achieve, are all 
undermining fundamental principles of Rule of Law. The Rule of Law is a 
prerequisite for membership in the EU; the ECtHR also directly apply 
principles of Rule of Law in their assessment of whether or not domestic 
legislation fulfils the requirements set out in ECHR article 8. Moreover, 
hidden SIGINT agreements and legislation which compromise citizens’ 
opportunity to actively take part in society and hold leaders accountable 
through informal responsibility, and foresee the consequences of their 
actions, intrinsically open doors to limit these factors in other matters as 
well. The current legal framework is rigorous in the way that accountability 
in international SIGINT matters could be exercised to some extent if, or 
when, a case reaches the court. However, the ICJ and the ECtHR are both 
bound by procedural rules which make the expansion of case- law a slow 
and costly process. In light of this, I believe that the current legal framework 
in SIGINT matters is inadequate. Regional frameworks such as supervisory 
organs would, in my mind, have lesser incentives for corruption and power 
abuse, and would enable a proactive supervision which is not bound by the 
procedural hindrances of the ECtHR to safeguard Rule of Law and human 
rights in the legal area. Setting an example of the democratic states in breach 
of their obligations is important, not least because it may have a profound 
impact on the future of SIGINT operations, when emerging global powers 
might have the same technology and capacity that the US, the UK, Sweden 
and Germany currently enjoy. 
 58 
Bibliography   
Unprinted Sources 
 
Hearing in the European Parliament on Mass Surveillance by the LIBE- 
committee; held in Brussels, Belgium on the 14
th
 October 2013. Video and 
audio recording accessed through 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yyw4MV_eamI 
 
Printed Sources 
 
Preparatory Legislation 
Prop. 2005/06:177 Åtgärder för att Förhindra vissa Särskilt Allvarliga Brott 
SOU 2009:66 Signalspaning för Polisiära Behov 
 
Swedish legislation 
SFS 2008:717 
SFS 2000:130 
SÖ 2007:63 
SÖ 2008:58 
 
EU-legislation (governed by Council of Europe) 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome 1950. 
 
Sources of international law 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 
 
American legislation and official governmental print 
USA Patriot Act, 107-56, 2001 
Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint 
Publication 1-02, 2010 
US Executive Order 12,333, 1981 
The UKUSA agreement, declassified in August 2010 pursuant to Executive 
Order 12,958 
 
Literature 
Dahlman, Christian: Rätt och Rättfärdigande, second edition, Lund, 
Studentlitteratur, 2010 
 
Danelius, Hans: Mänskliga rättigheter i Europeisk Praxis: en Kommentar 
till Europakonventionen om de Mänskliga Rättigheterna, third edition, 
Stockholm, Norstedts Juridik, 2007 
 
Fallon, Richard H. Jr: ‘The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse’,. In: Columbia Law Review vol. 97 No. 1, New York, 
Columbia Law Review Association, 1997 
 59 
 
Fuller, Lon: Morality of Law, revised edition, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1969 
 
Peczenik, Aleksander: ‘On Law and Reason’, In: Law and Philosophy 
Library vol. 8, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009 
 
Shaw, Malcolm N.: International Law, sixth edition, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2008 
 
Sloan, Lawrence D: ‘ECHELON and the Legal Restraints on Signals 
Intelligence: A Need for Reevaluation’. In: Duke Law Journal vol. 50 no. 5, 
Durham, Duke University School of Law, 2001 
 
Vile, John R: A Companion to the United States Constitution and its 
Amendments, fourth edition, Westport, Praeger Publishers, 2006 
 
 
Internet Sources (all sources last retrieved on 25
th
 May 2014) 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/exposed-australias-
asia-spy-network-20131030-2whia.html. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/03/nsa-asked-spying-congress-
bernie-sanders. 
http://www.publikt.se/artikel/riksdagen-vill-ha-besked-av-fra-46647. 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.co.uk/definition/Regulation-of-Investigatory-
Powers-Act 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/655996.stm 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72
921.pdf 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/09/24/international-law-not-empty-
promise 
http://www.trft.org/TRFTpix/spies9eR2006.pdf 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-
searches-email-calls 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/04/congress-nsa-
denied-access 
http://stoppafralagen.nu/node/164?page=4 
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/ 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=3 
http://democracyranking.org/?page_id=14 
http://www.whatisdemocracy.net/ 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I
V-4&chapter=4&lang=en 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/declaration/9.asp 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=II
I-3&chapter=3&lang=en 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17843.pdf 
 60 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=II
I-4&chapter=3&lang=en 
http://pesd.princeton.edu/?q=node/258 From Princeton Encyclopedia of 
self- determination 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-
membership/index_en.htm 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/25/intelligence-deal-uk-us-
released 
http://knlive.ctvnews.ca/mobile/the-knlive-hub/canada-s-role-in-secret-
intelligence-alliance-five-eyes-1.1489170 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/navy-spy-probe-kept-military-
in-dark-documents-1.1856151 
http://www.svt.se/ug/las-dokumenten-om-sverige-fran-edward-snowden 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/early_papers_1940-1944.pdf 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/new_ukusa_agree_10may55.p
df 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/ukusa-highlights-guide.pdf 
http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/ukusa/ukusa_comint_agree.pdf 
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/nsa-ueberwacht-500-millionen-
verbindungen-in-deutschland-a-908517.html 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-
edward-snowden 
http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/government-it/australia-gets-deluge-of-us-
secret-data-prompting-a-new-data-facility-20130612-2o4kf.html 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/04/how-we-
know-the-nsa-had-access-to-internal-google-and-yahoo-cloud-data/ 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-whistleblower-
edward-snowden-on-global-spying-a-910006.html 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/exposed-australias-
asia-spy-network-20131030-2whia.html 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-
reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html 
http://www.historycommons.org/context.jsp?item=civilliberties_215 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/655996.stm 
http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/fra-spionerar-pa-ryssland-at-usa 
http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-spying-on-energy-and-baltics-for-usa 
http://www.svt.se/ug/read-the-snowden-documents-from-the-nsa 
http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-hackar-datorer 
http://www.thelocal.se/20131209/secret-cold-war-treaty-confirms-sweden-
was-never-neutral 
http://www.svd.se/nyheter/inrikes/ask-och-bildt-kallas-till-
riksdagen_8491168.svd 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-
Lagar/Kammaren/Protokoll/Riksdagens-protokoll-2013142_H10924/ 
http://www.svt.se/nyheter/sverige/riksdagspartier-begar-korten-pa-bordet-
om-fra 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-
closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html 
 61 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/14/us-not-entering-no-spy-
agreement-germany-media 
http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/11/gspy-j11.html 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-
massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-whistleblower-
edward-snowden-on-global-spying-a-910006.html 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2477593/U-S-monitored-German-
Chancellor-Angela-Merkels-phone-2002.html 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-
merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/angela-merkel-proposes-
european-network-to-beat-nsa-spying-9132388.html 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-
obama 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/germany/weimarstr
engthweakrev_print.shtml 
http://hub.coe.int/what-we-do/human-rights/eu-accession-to-the-convention 
 62 
Table of Cases 
Issa and others vs. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 2004, 
31821/96  
 
Liberty and others vs. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 
2008, 58243/00 
 
Nicaragua vs. United States, International Court of Justice, 1986 I.C.J. 14 
 
The Tadić case, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
1999 IT-94-1-A 
 
Weber and Saravia vs. Germany, European Court of Human Rights, 2006, 
54934/00 
 63 
 
 
   
